Work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin in Europe: the role of taxes, benefits and population characteristics by Jara, H Xavier et al.
Work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin in Europe: the 
role of taxes, benefits and population characteristics 
 
H. Xavier Jara,a Katrin Gasior,b Mattia Makovec c 
 
a Corresponding author, email: hxjara@essex.ac.uk, Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), 
University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom, 0000-0001-6648-2653 
b Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom, 0000-
0003-4342-1174 




Tax and benefit systems play an important role in determining work incentives at both the extensive and the 
intensive margin of labour supply. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of 
work incentives in the European Union and the United Kingdom. Our analysis makes use of microsimulation 
techniques and representative household surveys to compare the distribution of short- and long-term participation 
tax rates and marginal effective tax rates across population subgroups. We focus on people currently in work and 
characterise the population facing low work incentives in each country. Our results highlight the large variation 
in the distribution of work incentives across Europe, explained not only by differences in the design of tax-benefit 
systems, but also by the characteristics of the labour force across countries. Unemployment insurance benefits 
contribute substantially to short-term participation tax rates and explain on average a 20 percentage point 
difference between work incentives of short- vs. long-term unemployment. Our analysis further highlights the 
need to use microdata to study differences across countries in terms of the population subgroups facing low 
incentives to work with the aim to inform the policy debate on potential reforms to make work pay. 
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1. Introduction  
For more than a decade, “making work pay” (i.e. ensuring that work is financially more attractive than relying 
solely on publicly provided social benefits) has come at the forefront of the policy agenda in European countries 
(Figari and Matsaganis, 2016). In this sense, the design of tax-benefit systems plays an important role as it might 
influence the incentive to take up (or give up) a job and to work or earn more (or less). Providing a description of 
work incentives embedded in tax-benefit systems at the population level in Europe and identifying those groups 
with low work incentives is a necessary first step in order to assess the effectiveness of potential reforms to make 
work pay and to target labour market activation policies on these groups.  
The analysis of the role of tax-benefit systems on work incentives has focused on two different margins: the 
extensive margin of labour supply (incentives to take up or give up work) and the intensive margin (incentives to 
work or earn more or less). At the extensive margin, the generosity and duration of unemployment insurance or 
social assistance benefits have often been associated with disincentives to take up work for certain population 
subgroups. At the intensive margin, high marginal tax rates have been discussed as factors reducing incentives to 
work or earn more. 
Commonly used indicators of work incentives are usually based on synthetic (or hypothetical) households (see 
OECD, 2016). Such indicators are particularly useful to analyse the presence of unemployment or poverty traps 
among specific family types. However, they do not allow us to provide a full representation of the distribution of 
work incentives in the population, or to identify which population subgroups are more likely to be affected by low 
work incentives. The aim of this paper is therefore to provide a comparative and comprehensive analysis of work 
incentives at the extensive and intensive margin in the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK)1, 
based on representative household microdata. In particular, we use EUROMOD, the European tax-benefit 
microsimulation model, to compare the short- and long-term participation tax rates (PTRs) and marginal effective 
tax rates (METRs) in 2017 for individuals currently in work in European countries. Further, our analysis provides 
a characterisation of individuals facing low work incentives, and assesses how labour market incentives have 
changed over time across countries due to changes in tax-benefit policies (i.e. keeping the population fixed), in 
the last ten years.  
Our focus on individuals in work is in line with the growing literature analysing the changing nature of jobs, which 
has highlighted the importance of studying the situation of workers. Increased automation has put jobs in certain 
occupations at risk (Goos and Salomons 2009; OECD 2015). There has also been an increase in non-standard 
forms of employment such as self-employment, part-time work and temporary jobs. Moreover, many European 
countries have experienced a rise in in-work poverty rates (Eurofound 2017; Lohmann and Marx 2018). Our 
analysis is in line with these studies and aims to focus on another dimension related to the situation of people in 
work, namely the financial incentives to work inherent in the tax-benefit system for this population. The focus on 
individuals currently in work allows us to assess on the one hand the potential unemployment traps workers might 
face in case they lose their jobs, and on the other hand to consider incentives at the intensive margin, which are 
important to identify individuals facing poverty traps while in work.  
Recent studies, making use of representative household microdata, have focused on the effect of tax-benefit 
systems on work incentives in single countries. Pirttillä and Selin (2011) provide a description of METRs and 
PTRs in Sweden over the period 2006-2010. Decoster et al. (2015) study the effect of changes in tax-benefit 
systems on work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin in Belgium over the period 1992-2012. Bartels 
and Pestel (2016) compute short- and long-term PTRs in Germany over the period 1993-2010 and assess the 
importance of work incentives in the decision of individuals to take up work. Navickė et al. (2016) study the effect 
of potential reforms to unemployment and social assistance benefits on financial incentives to work at the 
extensive margin in Lithuania. Recent cross-country studies using microdata are, on the other hand, scarce. Studies 
by Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2007), Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Verdelin (2011) and 
O’Donoghue (2011) have, for instance, looked at work incentives across European countries but for tax-benefit 
rules in place in 1998. More recently, Jara and Tumino (2013) present a comparison of work incentives for the 
EU27 (including the UK, excluding Croatia), but focusing only on the intensive margin of labour supply. Finally, 
 
1 The analysis is based on 2017 when the United Kingdom was still member of the European Union. 
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Collado, Cantillon, Van den Bosch, Goedemé and Vandelannoote (2019) calculate the cost of reducing the poverty 
gap while holding work incentives at the extensive margin constant but only in three countries: Belgium, Denmark 
and the UK.  
In summary, our research contributes to the literature in four different ways. First, it provides an up-to-date 
comparative analysis of work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin for all European countries, based 
on representative household microdata which enables us to assess the heterogeneity of work incentives across 
population subgroups. Second, we estimate both short- and long-term (when entitlement to unemployment 
insurance benefits has been exhausted) PTRs in order to highlight the extent to which unemployment insurance 
and social assistance benefits affect work incentives at the extensive margin across countries, vis-à-vis income 
taxes and social insurance contributions. Third, we provide a portrait of the individuals facing low work incentives 
at the extensive and intensive margin across countries. Fourth, we assess how labour market incentives have 
evolved across countries during the last decade by holding population and labour market characteristics constant 
and focusing on the policy effect.  
Our results highlight a number of interesting findings. First, there is a large variation in the distribution of work 
incentives, at the population level, across countries, emphasising the importance of using representative microdata 
in the analysis. On the one hand, cross-country differences in the distribution of work incentives reflect differences 
in the design of tax-benefit systems and, on the other hand, differences in the composition of the labour market 
across countries. We provide a sensitivity analysis where we test the extent to which work incentives are affected 
by changes in the population structure. Second, our assessment of short- and long-term PTRs highlights the 
importance of unemployment insurance benefits on work incentives at the extensive margin. Long-term PTRs are 
on average 20 percentage points lower than short-term PTRs. Third, in general, employees and workers at the 
bottom of the earnings distribution face the highest short- and long-term PTRs, which might be related to the 
existence of lower limits for unemployment insurance benefits (short-term) or social assistance (long-term). At 
the intensive margin, the highest METRs are observed for high earners, which is most likely related to the 
progressivity of direct taxes in most countries. A comparison over time furthermore shows that these results have 
been quite stable over the last 10 years in most countries, which can be attributed to a certain path-dependency of 
social policy.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology followed to calculate 
indicators of work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin using the microsimulation model EUROMOD, 
based on representative household microdata. Section 3 presents the results focusing on the distribution of work 
incentives across countries, the composition of work incentives by income source, the variation of work incentives 
across different population subgroups, a description of the characteristics of individuals facing low work 
incentives in each country, and an analysis of the evolution of labour market incentives over time. Finally, section 
4 concludes by summarising the main findings and discussing their policy implications.  
2. Methodology 
2.1. EUROMOD and the data 
Our analysis makes use of EUROMOD (version H1.0), the tax-benefit microsimulation model for the European 
Union. EUROMOD simulates direct taxes and social insurance contributions liabilities, as well as cash benefit 
entitlements for the household population of all EU countries and the UK.2 The underlying microdata used for our 
simulations in EUROMOD comes from the 2015 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Condition 
(EU-SILC) for all countries except the UK, where the 2014/2015 Family Resources Survey (FRS) is used. In this 
study, the tax and benefit rules used are those in place on the 30th of June 2017, which we refer to as 2017 policy 
systems. Market income and non-simulated income components in the data have been updated to 2017 according 
 
2 See Sutherland and Figari (2013) for further information. 
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to actual changes in prices and incomes over the relevant period. No adjustment is made for changes in population 
composition between 2015 and 2017. 
The tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD is a unique tool to carry out distributional analysis and 
measure labour market incentives implied by tax/benefits systems for all European countries. The EU together 
with the UK are also a perfect laboratory in which to study these issues, since countries vary widely in the 
generosity of unemployment and social assistance benefits, which will affect incentives at the extensive margin, 
but also in the progressivity of income taxes and the design of social insurance contributions, which will be 
reflected in differences in work incentives at the intensive margin. Belgium, Germany, Finland, Austria and 
Bulgaria, for instance, are characterised by generous unemployment insurance with a payment of around 60 
percent of previous earnings and a duration of 12 months or more. In Hungary, unemployment insurance also 
represents 60 percent of previous earnings but is only paid for up to three months. The payment is lower in 
Lithuania, which is made of a fixed basic part plus a variable part starting at 40 percent of previous earnings and 
going down to 20 percent after three months. Unemployment insurance is the least generous in the UK with a flat 
payment between £58 and £73 per week for a duration of six months. Unemployment assistance is also available 
in Germany, Hungary, Austria and Finland, among others, which can act as a top-up or complement 
unemployment insurance when this is exhausted, or be available for individuals who are not eligible for 
unemployment insurance. Furthermore, many countries provide national social assistance benefits in order to 
guarantee a minimum level of income to low-income households (guaranteed minimum income benefits). The 
exception is Italy which introduced a national-level guaranteed minimum income benefit in January 2018, not 
modelled in the current 2017 tax-benefit system.  
In terms of income tax, the degree of progressivity varies across countries, with several cases of flat-tax systems, 
such as Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia. Other characteristics of the tax-benefit system will also reflect 
differences in work incentives across countries, such as the existence of in-work benefits (particularly important 
in the UK and Hungary). Finally, countries also vary substantially in terms of labour market characteristics  
(e.g. the share of self-employed or part-time workers), the distribution of earnings and household composition 
(e.g. presence of secondary earners or children), which together with the design of tax-benefit systems will affect 
the distribution of work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin. 
The tax-benefit model EUROMOD is used to calculate work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin for 
individuals currently in work. As previously mentioned, the focus on individuals currently in work allows us to 
consider incentives at the intensive margin and to provide insights into potential unemployment traps they might 
face if they lose their jobs. At the extensive margin, Participation Tax Rates (PTRs) are calculated by means of 
simulating transitions from work into unemployment. Our analysis considers PTRs rather than net replacement 
rates because net replacement rates can be significantly influenced by the market income of other individuals in 
the household, whereas PTRs allow us to abstract from such effects (O’Donoghue 2011). Thus, PTRs are a useful 
indicator of incentives to work at the extensive margin in order to highlight the role played by the tax-benefit 
system in the formation of incentives to work. Moreover, our analysis provides a description of both short- and 
long-term PTRs in order to highlight the role played by unemployment insurance (and social assistance) schemes 
in different countries. In our analysis, long-term PTRs are defined based on disposable income out of work when 
entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits has been exhausted. At the intensive margin, Marginal Effective 
Tax Rates (METRs) are computed assuming a marginal increase in earnings. For both PTR and METR, it is 
assumed that behaviour of other household members does not change when a person becomes unemployed or 
when their earnings increase.  
We restrict our sample of analysis to individuals with positive earnings, aged 18 to 65, excluding those in full-
time education or retirement. Table 8 in Appendix C presents the characteristics of the samples in each country. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we further assume full compliance in the sense that adjustments for tax evasion 
and benefit non-take-up are not taken into account for the calculation of work incentives. As such, the results 
should be interpreted as the “intended effect” of the tax and benefit system on labour market incentives. Finally, 
it is worth mentioning that despite EUROMOD’s flexibility in simulating a variety of tax-benefit instruments, the 
effect of certain policies on work incentives might be difficult to capture. For instance, eligibility for temporary 
measures to stimulate employment consisting of benefit payments over a short number of months while in work 
might be complex to simulate. As a result, such benefits might be either taken directly from the data (not 
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simulated) or entitlement might not be fully captured, meaning that their effect on work incentives might be 
underestimated. In general, this type of benefits affects only a relatively small share of the population.  
2.2. Calculation of Participation Tax Rates (PTRs) 
The participation tax rate (PTR) is an indicator of the financial incentives to take-up or to give up work, implied 
by the tax-benefit system. As such, PTRs are an indicator of incentives at the extensive margin of labour supply. 
In particular, PTR can be defined as the proportion of earnings taken away by increased taxes and social insurance 
contributions or by reduced benefits when transitions from unemployment to work are simulated. Alternatively, 
PTR can also be interpreted as the proportion of earnings kept in the form of increased benefits or reduced taxes 
and social insurance contributions when transitions from work into unemployment are considered.  
The approach used in this paper to calculate PTRs consists of moving people currently in work (employment or 
self-employment) in the data into unemployment and re-calculating their new disposable income by means of the 
microsimulation model EUROMOD, hence capturing the implications of tax and benefit systems under their new 
labour market status. As such, we interpret PTRs as the proportion of earnings kept in the form of benefits or 
reduced taxes and social insurance contributions. The rationale for our focus on transitions from work into 
unemployment is threefold. First, simulating transitions from unemployment or inactivity into work would require 
imposing a number of important assumptions in order to simulate disposable income in work. For instance, wages 
as well as hours of work and employment status (i.e. employee or self-employed) would need to be imputed for 
non-workers, and in some cases industry or occupation if tax-benefit rules depend on such characteristics. Second, 
focusing on those currently in work allows us to consider a large share of the working-age population rather than 
the selected group of unemployed which varies greatly in size across countries. Third, high PTRs do not 
necessarily translate into a higher share of unemployed as these indicators do not reflect individual preferences 
for work (but rather financial incentives implied by the tax-benefit system) and the decision on whether someone 
enters employment is not necessarily voluntary but driven by labour market constraints. Thus, measured like this, 
PTRs are not only a measure of work incentives but also a measure of income protection in the case of 
unemployment for a large population group. In addition, we include results for the 10 percent of those currently 
in employment most at risk of unemployment which provides a proxy for those currently in unemployment and 
how results would look like if we were to transition currently unemployed into employment. 
The approach used to simulate transitions from work to unemployment in EUROMOD is described in detail in 
Appendix A.  
More formally, the Participation Tax Rate for individual i in household h can be expressed as: 





   ,                                                                                                                (1) 
where Ei represents gross earnings of individual i when they are in work, Yh
Wi represents household disposable 
income when individual i is in work (Wi), and Yh
Ui represents household disposable income when individual i is 
in unemployment (Ui). In the case of households with multiple earners, PTRs are calculated for each earner in the 
household separately, assuming that the behaviour of other earners and household members does not change when 
a person becomes unemployed. 
The role of different income sources in work incentives at the extensive margin can be described by decomposing 
household disposable income as the arithmetical sum of original incomes (O) (incomes before any tax and 
transfer), benefits and pensions (B), minus taxes (T) and social insurance contributions (S). Equation (1) can hence 
be rewritten as:   





= 1 − (
∆Oh + ∆Bh − ∆Th − ∆Sh
Ei
)  ,                                            (2) 
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where ∆Bh represents, for instance, the difference between household benefits and pensions when individual i is 
in work and when individual i is unemployed. Moreover, since the change in original incomes is equal to the 
change in earnings, the expression can be further rewritten as: 
PTRi = − (





S   ,                                             (3) 
where the first component represents the change in benefits and pensions at the household level when individual 
i  enters unemployment, as a percentage of individual i 's earnings; and the last two components report, 
respectively, the change in taxes and in social insurance contributions at the household level when individual i 
enters unemployment, as a percentage of earnings. In our analysis of PTRs, we further decompose benefits into 
three components: (i) unemployment benefits, including both unemployment insurance and unemployment 
assistance schemes; (ii) social assistance benefits, including minimum income schemes, housing benefits, etc.; 
and (iii) other benefits, which include family and education benefits, in-work benefits (such as the Working Tax 
Credit in the UK), disability benefits (such as health, disability and invalidity benefits) and public pensions. The 
analysis only takes simulated benefits into account while non-simulated benefits, i.e. taken from the input data 
due to lack of information to simulate them, cannot be adjusted to the new labour market status (see Appendix B 
for information on simulated other benefits). Pensions only contribute to other benefits on very rare occasions as 
pensioners are by definition excluded from our analysis and the pension rights of other household members are 
only affected if the means-test is based on employment income from other household members. 
Decomposing benefits into unemployment, social assistance and other benefits is particularly important in the 
analysis of short- and long-term PTRs. The role of unemployment insurance benefits would be particularly 
important for short-term PTRs, while social assistance benefits would play a larger role in long-term PTRs, which 
are defined here based on disposable income out of work when entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits 
has been exhausted. 
In principle, one would expect PTRs to range between 0 and 100 percent. While a PTR of 100 indicates a low 
work incentive as the income would remain the same, a PTR of 0 indicates a high work incentive. However, 
specific features of tax and benefit systems could result in PTRs taking values above 100 percent. For instance, 
the presence of lower limits of unemployment insurance schemes (minimum payment amounts for those satisfying 
the minimum required eligibility conditions) could result in disposable income in unemployment being higher 
than disposable income in work for low earners. Negative PTRs could be, for instance, the result of losing some 
type of tax credits when entering unemployment. Although PTRs outside the range of 0 to 100 percent are 
plausible, in our analysis we exclude the top percentile of the distribution of PTRs if the PTR is above 150 percent 
and the lowest percentile if the PTR is negative. This restriction is chosen in order to reduce the risk of our 
calculations being biased by “outliers”, especially when we consider PTRs by earning quintiles and for different 
population subgroups.3 
2.3. Calculation of Marginal Effective Tax Rates (METRs) 
The marginal effective tax rate (METR) is an indicator of the financial incentives to work more (at a given wage 
rate) or earn more (i.e. increase effort at a given number of hours of work). As such, METRs are a popular indicator 
of the incentives faced by workers on the intensive margin of labour supply. In particular, the METR measures 
the proportion of a marginal increase in earnings that would be taxed away due to social insurance contributions, 
taxes and loss of benefit entitlement.  
The calculations of METRs in EUROMOD are described in detail by Jara and Tumino (2013) and use the 
following steps: first, household disposable income is calculated; then, for each earner in the household, in turn, 
individual earnings are increased by 3 percent and the corresponding household disposable incomes are 
 
3 A similar procedure is suggested by Jara and Tumino (2013) in their analysis of marginal effective tax rates. 
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computed.4 METRs are therefore specific to each earner in the household. More formally, the marginal effective 
tax rate of individual i in household h is given by: 






0   ,                                                                                                              (4) 
where the numerator measures the change in household disposable income before (Yh
0)  and after (Yh
1) the increase 
in individual earnings (Ei) and the denominator is equal to the increase in earnings itself. 
As in the case of PTR, the role of different income components on METR can be calculated by decomposing 
household disposable income as the sum of original incomes (O), benefits and pensions (B), minus taxes (T) and 
social insurance contributions (S). Equation (4) can be then rewritten as:   
METRi = 1 −
∆Yh
∆Ei
= 1 − (
∆Oh + ∆Bh − ∆Th − ∆Sh
∆Ei
) ,                                                   (5) 
where now ∆Bh represents the difference between household benefits and pensions before and after the increase 
in individual i's earnings. Since the change in original incomes is equal to the change in earnings, we obtain: 
METRi = − (





S   ,                            (6) 
where the first component represents the change in benefits and pensions at the household level as a percentage 
of the earnings increase and the last two components represent the change in taxes and social insurance 
contributions as a percentage of the earnings increase.  
METRs would also be expected to take values between 0 and 100 percent. A value of 0 means that individuals 
keep all of the earnings increase, while 100 means that the total increase is taken away due to higher taxation, 
additional social insurance contributions or the loss of benefit entitlements. However, certain aspects of tax and 
benefit rules could result in METRs outside this range. METRs above 100 could, for instance, be related to the 
loss of some benefit entitlement, which would overcome the marginal increase in earnings. Negative values of 
METRs could, on the other hand, arise from tax allowances or benefit entitlements paid to people with income 
above a given threshold. Individuals crossing the threshold after an increase in earnings would experience a larger 
increase in household disposable income, resulting in negative METR (Immervoll 2004). In our calculations, we 
exclude the top percentile of the METR distribution if the METR is above 150 percent and the lowest percentile 
if the METR is negative, in order to reduce the risk of our results being biased by “outliers”.  
3. Results 
This section presents results focusing on five aspects drawing from the use of microdata for the analysis of work 
incentives. First, the distribution of PTRs and METRs across the population of analysis is discussed in a cross-
country perspective. Then, work incentives are decomposed by three main income sources: taxes, social insurance 
contributions and benefits. Third, the use of microdata is exploited to present work incentive indicators for 
different population subgroups and to discuss their variation across countries. Fourth, a portrait of people facing 
low work incentives at the extensive and extensive margin in each country is provided. The fifth part of the 
analysis presents an overview of the main evolution of work incentives in the EU and the UK over the last decade.  
 
4 As such, we calculate the incentives to earn more rather than to work more, as we do not increase hours of work. The marginal 
increase of 3 percent in earnings roughly corresponds to an extra hour of work for a person working 40 hours per week (Jara 
and Tumino 2013). The choice of a marginal increase in earnings rather than an increase in hours of work is motivated by the 
lack of precise information about working hours in EU-SILC (i.e mismatch between the income reference period and the 
reference period for labour market characteristics). In some countries, our measure of METR would not enable us to capture 
the fact that working more hours might result in a loss of entitlement to certain social benefits. Social benefits, where eligibility 
depends on the number of hours worked, exist in Denmark (social assistance), Germany (unemployment benefit I and parental 
leave benefits), Ireland (Supplementary Welfare Allowance), France (tax credits), Slovenia (social assistance) and the UK 
(Income Support and Working Tax Credit). 
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3.1. Comparing PTRs and METRs across countries 
This section discusses the general level and distribution of short-term PTRs, long-term PTRs and METRs with a 
focus on mean and median work incentives as well as the inter-quartile range between the 75th and 25th percentile 
of each indicator. The analysis reveals the advantage of using household representative data to calculate work 
incentives, and the results illustrate the significant variation in the distributions of short- and long-term PTRs and 
METRs across countries. 
The first part of this section focuses on short-term PTRs, namely the rates during the first year of unemployment, 
presented in the first set of columns in Table 1. Results show the high variation of work incentives across 
countries: the highest average short-term PTRs can be found in Luxembourg, followed by France, Denmark, 
Belgium, Portugal, Finland and Germany. In general, these countries are characterised by quite generous 
unemployment insurance schemes with a strong contributory component, which can explain high PTRs in the 
short-term. The lowest average long-term PTRs are observed on the other hand in the UK, Romania, Cyprus, 
Lithuania and Malta. In the latter countries, the proportion of earnings that is kept in the form of increased benefits 
or lower taxes when an individual becomes unemployed is less than 50 percent. Thus, individuals have on average 
a higher incentive to be employed. On the other hand, rewards to work are relatively small in countries with high 
PTRs which in turn means that these countries provide quite a generous safety net in case of unemployment and/or 
that a substantial amount of gross wages are taxed away. In Luxembourg for example, reduced taxes and increased 
benefit entitlements would mean that an employee would receive more than 80 percent of their earnings in case 
of unemployment, on average. 
The association between work incentives and labour market outcomes has been of particular interest in literature. 
Overly high PTR might influence decisions to give up work, which would translate into higher rates of 
unemployment. Figure 6 in Appendix C plots short-term PTR against unemployment rates across countries. The 
left-hand panel presents average short-term PTR across the whole population, which show an extremely low 
correlation (0.034) with unemployment rates. The right-hand panel of Figure 6 focuses on average short-term PTR 
across individuals with low earnings (i.e. first quintile of the earnings distribution in each country), which are 
more likely to be at risk of unemployment. In this case, the positive correlation with unemployment rates is higher 
(0.278) but still relatively weak. The modest correlation between short-term PTR and unemployment rates reflects 
the fact that, in addition to the design of tax-benefit systems, other factors might affect individuals’ choices in the 
labour market, for instance labour demand constraints. We come back to this discussion in the conclusion. 
Table 1 also illustrates the importance of considering the distribution of PTRs rather than focusing on the average 
or median values only. The inter-quartiles presented in the table for each country highlight that, overall, national 
tax and benefit systems contribute to quite different distributions of PTRs across countries. Results show that 
countries with relatively similar mean PTRs might exhibit different distributions, as in the case of Denmark and 
Portugal, for instance. Further, the table shows that substantial dispersion of PTRs can occur at high (Denmark 
and Portugal), intermediate (Sweden, Netherlands, Greece, Bulgaria and Italy) or low (Ireland, Poland, the UK 
and Malta) average levels of PTRs. 
Results also show the extent to which the median of the PTRs distribution differs from the mean. We observe a 
higher concentration of people with higher-than-average work disincentives in countries where the median is 
higher than the mean. Generally, this is the case in countries with relatively high average short-term PTRs, and in 
particular in the Netherlands, Bulgaria and Italy. On the other hand, countries with relatively low average PTRs 
also show greater concentration towards the bottom of the distribution (the median is lower than the mean), as in 
the case of Malta and Spain. 
The PTRs presented so far show the financial incentive for working versus not working during the first year of 
unemployment. However, individuals may base their labour supply decision not only on the short-term change in 
income but may also take a longer time horizon into account (Bartels and Pestel 2016). Once unemployed, 
individuals might also be faced with long-term unemployment and need to rely on the safety net provided after 
receipt of unemployment insurance is exhausted. We present long-term PTRs and discuss their difference to short-
term PTRs in the following paragraphs. In our analysis, long-term PTRs are defined based on disposable income 
out of work when entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits has been exhausted. 
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Table 1 Distribution of short/long-term PTRs and METRs in 2017. Note: countries in alphabetical order (based on 
their national language). See also Figure 7-9 in the Appendix for a graphical representation of the table and 
Tables 12-14 for a sensitivity analysis with reweighted results. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD 
version H1.0 
 A. Short-term PTR B. Long-term PTR C. METR 
Mean Median p25 p75 Mean Median p25 p75 Mean Median p25 p75 
BE 74.3 77.8 70.9 83.9 48.1 47.6 40.6 55.2 54.2 55.3 53.5 59.7 
BG 61.8 67.0 50.0 77.0 25.3 22.0 22.0 27.8 21.9 22.0 22.0 22.0 
CZ 49.4 48.2 41.2 56.6 34.8 31.1 25.2 40.3 28.5 31.1 31.1 31.1 
DK 75.2 74.9 66.8 84.3 56.8 49.8 41.6 66.0 46.0 42.8 40.4 55.8 
DE 70.8 74.8 69.9 78.7 43.5 42.4 33.3 53.4 45.3 44.5 40.8 49.2 
EE 51.4 55.5 44.9 57.1 34.5 30.7 26.4 38.0 23.1 22.9 21.3 22.9 
IE 47.5 45.0 36.6 53.0 44.2 43.8 31.3 52.9 41.2 50.0 29.0 53.0 
EL 61.7 55.7 49.7 66.8 45.8 42.8 33.5 54.2 32.6 36.0 16.5 40.8 
ES 49.8 44.0 37.5 55.7 32.1 28.6 16.1 38.6 23.5 28.8 6.3 34.8 
FR 77.3 79.6 75.9 82.6 39.9 38.7 30.1 49.1 39.5 37.1 22.3 43.5 
HR 53.9 56.0 46.7 63.8 28.7 26.9 21.6 32.7 28.1 20.0 20.0 41.5 
IT 56.6 64.8 42.0 70.7 24.1 25.0 15.6 34.1 40.2 43.4 35.6 49.1 
CY 43.4 39.3 36.8 46.6 30.7 20.6 9.1 45.7 23.4 13.2 7.8 30.9 
LV 53.2 58.1 50.4 62.3 30.2 28.5 25.0 30.4 31.1 31.1 31.1 32.9 
LT 43.3 41.6 34.8 49.5 24.8 22.4 15.8 29.5 26.6 31.5 24.0 31.5 
LU 82.8 87.8 82.7 90.0 43.6 42.2 28.2 56.1 43.7 43.5 28.9 50.0 
HU 51.1 47.1 41.9 51.0 41.5 34.5 33.9 44.0 29.1 34.5 34.5 34.5 
MT 38.8 30.5 26.2 48.5 34.9 25.4 20.3 47.8 25.8 25.0 23.2 31.1 
NL 64.0 71.4 57.2 78.4 32.7 29.1 18.3 39.4 41.3 49.2 34.8 49.2 
AT 68.3 68.6 64.9 71.4 47.8 45.0 33.9 57.0 42.3 43.3 36.8 48.2 
PL 46.4 42.5 36.8 52.4 33.9 29.7 27.4 38.6 29.5 30.3 29.2 30.3 
PT 74.0 79.2 72.8 86.9 42.3 36.7 21.6 56.7 31.0 35.8 11.0 39.5 
RO 44.4 49.3 41.5 54.8 29.1 29.0 25.6 34.5 33.0 29.9 29.9 33.1 
SI 59.0 58.1 49.7 67.8 39.6 36.3 30.5 46.0 39.7 38.6 30.6 42.2 
SK 48.6 49.3 46.0 50.1 37.8 30.8 28.2 45.3 32.8 29.9 29.9 34.0 
FI 70.6 70.8 68.9 74.2 56.0 51.6 48.4 60.0 45.6 46.9 39.5 50.5 
SE 66.9 64.6 59.3 73.4 30.7 26.0 23.3 34.4 38.7 32.3 28.8 52.3 
UK 45.0 40.7 35.1 53.4 35.7 32.8 22.3 47.1 38.9 34.4 32.0 42.5 
 
The second set of columns in Table 1 shows that long-term PTRs are substantially lower than short-term PTRs 
across countries. The difference between short- and long-term PTRs is driven by the effect of unemployment 
insurance schemes (see section 3.2), which provide a large degree of income protection in the short-run but in 
general are of limited duration. The finding is particularly important as, with a few exceptions, most studies based 
on microdata have overlooked the relevance of unemployment insurance benefits in affecting work incentives at 
the extensive margin. The ranking of countries, however, is almost preserved. The highest average long-term 
PTRs are registered in Denmark and Finland (both 56 percent), followed by Belgium, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Germany. The lowest values of long-term PTRs instead are observed in Bulgaria, Italy and 
Lithuania. While short-term PTRs range between 83 and 38 percent, long-term PTRs range between 56 percent 
and 20 percent.Thus, work incentives increase with the duration in unemployment. This can be explained by the 
nature of unemployment benefits. The newly unemployed are mostly eligible for unemployment insurance which 
is limited to a certain period. Once unemployment insurance is exhausted, the unemployed may be eligible for 
unemployment assistance in a limited number of countries (for instance in Germany, Hungary, Finland, the United 
Kingdom and Austria). Unemployment assistance is still very often earnings-related but the replacement rate (less 
generous) and eligibility criteria differ from unemployment insurance. Once the unemployed person has exhausted 
all kinds of unemployment benefits they would need to rely on the social net of last resort, such as social assistance 
benefits. Typically, social assistance benefits target low income individuals and households to guarantee a 
minimum level of income. As such, the level of the benefit is independent of previous earnings but often based 
on the household structure, the household’s means and other income sources. The different nature, purpose and 
target groups of these benefits lead to differences in short- vs. long-term PTRs. The average difference across 
countries is 21 percentage points. The largest differences are observed in Belgium (over 44 percentage points), 
followed by Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, and Ireland. On the other hand, the smallest 
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differences are registered in Ireland and Malta and in the UK. These low values suggest that work incentives in 
the latter countries are very similar for the short-term and the long-term unemployed.  
Long-term PTRs are not only lower than short-term PTRs but also show a greater dispersion. This might result 
from high heterogeneity in targeting systems for social assistance benefits, as well as from differential effects of 
the tax-system on the lowest incomes. Further, we notice that in general the median long-term PTR is below the 
national mean for almost all countries, suggesting a higher concentration of individuals at lower long-term PTR 
levels.   
The third set of columns in Table 1 presents results on METRs. While the PTRs discussed focus on the incentive 
to actually participate in the labour market, the following sections focus on the incentives faced by workers on the 
intensive margin of labour supply. METRs measure the strength of the incentive for individuals to slightly increase 
their earnings either through working more hours or bonus payments and promotion from the current employer or 
by getting a better paid job. 
Countries with higher mean METRs are typically characterised by highly progressive tax systems, such as 
Belgium, where on average 54 percent of the gross wage increase is lost as a result of higher income taxes, SICs, 
and lower benefits. The other countries registering high disincentives at the intensive margin are Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Austria, Netherlands, and Ireland, where over 40 percent of the wage increase 
would be taxed away. Bulgaria (followed by Malta, Estonia, Cyprus and Spain) is the country providing the 
highest incentive to earn more: an increase in gross wage would be taxed away for less than 22 percent on average5.  
Fig. 1 Short-term PTRs vs. Long-term PTRs (left) and vs. METRs (right) in 2017. Note: average values shown, the 
dotted line refers to the EU plus UK average. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0+. 
 
 
Table 1 also presents results for the 25th and 75th percentile of METRs which are typically quite narrow in 
countries with a flat-tax system (or a tax-system based on very few tax brackets), such as Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania. In these countries, the distribution of METRs is highly concentrated 
around the mean. Alternatively, we observe greater variation in METRs in countries like Spain, Cyprus, Croatia, 
Portugal, Greece, France, and Ireland, mostly due to the greater progressivity in the income tax system.  
 
5  Our calculations include employee social insurance contributions only while including employer social insurance 
contributions might actually lead to different tax wedges. 
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Figure 1 provides a summary of average PTRs and METRs in comparison to each other. It offers a useful synthetic 
characterisation of countries according to the work disincentives implied by their tax/benefits systems. The left-
hand side presents short-term PTRs in comparison to long-term PTRs. In the top right quadrant, in fact, we observe 
countries that present above-average short-term and long-term PTRs. Here we find traditionally generous welfare 
states such as Nordic countries (Denmark and Finland), and continental welfare models (e.g. Germany, Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, Austria). The chart is also useful to identify the countries which are relatively generous in 
the coverage of the short-term unemployed, but not so much for the long-term unemployed (e.g. the top left 
quadrant: Sweden, the Netherlands and Bulgaria). On the other hand, countries relatively more generous with the 
long-term unemployed, such as Ireland, and Hungary, belong to the bottom-right quadrant. A numerous group is 
finally formed by countries with relatively low short-term and long-term PTRs consisting of the Baltic countries, 
the UK, and several Central-Eastern European countries (e.g. Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, and Slovenia). 
The right-hand side of Figure 1 combines information on short-term PTRs and METRs to characterise countries 
on the basis of the incentives to work provided by their tax/benefits systems, on both the intensive and extensive 
margin. The top-right quadrant includes Nordic countries and continental welfare systems, meaning countries 
presenting low work incentives both at the extensive and at the intensive margin (e.g. through generous benefits 
and steep tax schedules). Many of these countries provide high levels of support to both short- and long-term 
unemployed which come at a cost of high taxes and social insurance contributions for those in employment. In 
the bottom-right quadrant we find Anglo-Saxon economies (UK and Ireland) and Slovenia, characterised by 
relatively low incentives towards short-term unemployment, but higher than average marginal tax rates, due to 
tax schedules which impose high marginal tax rates, also at lower incomes. The opposite holds for countries like 
Portugal, Greece and Bulgaria, which seem to offer lower incentives at the extensive margin, but more so on the 
intensive margin. Finally, the bottom-left quadrant includes countries showing relatively higher incentives at both 
extensive and intensive margins, including mostly Eastern European countries, the Baltic countries, and Spain.  
It is important to note that the differences in work incentives across countries reflect differences in tax-benefit 
policies but also differences in population characteristics. In order to have a better idea of the role of population 
characteristics, we perform a sensitivity analysis, where the population of each country is reweighted to match the 
population of each of the other 27 countries. This analysis shows how work incentives would look like if all 
countries were to have similar shares of key population characteristics as those of the country used for the 
reweighting.6 The largest population differences concern skill levels as well as the share of self-employed. 
Controlling for these characteristics not only changes the population structure but would, to some extent, also 
change the earnings distribution in the country. However, the earnings distribution and other uncontrolled 
characteristics such as family structure would still differ across countries. 
Nevertheless, work incentive levels remain stable across countries and indicators (+/- 4 percentage points) even 
after the population is reweighted (see Tables 12-14 in the Appendix). There are only a few exceptions: Italy for 
short-term PTRs, Greece for long-term PTRs as well as Portugal and Hungary for METRs. Overall, the sensitivity 
analysis suggests that differences in work incentives are mainly driven by the tax-benefit system. This is also line 
with previous results comparing microdata with hypothetical households, which abstract from differences in 
population structure and show the pure policy effect (Gasior and Recchia, 2019). 
3.2. Decomposition of PTRs and METRs 
While the previous section showed that countries comprise of different average levels emphasising the general 
role of different tax-benefit elements, this section sheds light on the country-specific decomposition of the 
indicators. It discusses the decomposition of mean PTRs (short- and long-term) and METR across countries by 
main income sources: unemployment benefits, social assistance benefits, family benefits and pensions, and 
reduced income taxes and social insurance contributions.   
 
6 Reweighted results make use of reweight2 (Browne, 2012) in STATA. We reweight based on the following characteristics: 
age (0-9, 10-19, 20-34, 35-49, 50-64, 65+), gender (woman, men), education (restricted to those aged 20-64: maximum lower 
secondary, (post) secondary, tertiary), labour market status (employed, self-employed, unemployed/inactive, other inactive). 
A reduced version of this model is applied to selected country combinations. 
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Starting with short-term PTRs, Figure 2 shows that, on average, unemployment benefits are the most important 
component of PTRs, followed by social insurance contributions and direct income taxes. However, important 
differences exist across countries. Countries characterised by generous unemployment insurance systems show 
PTRs above 70 percent, and, in these countries, unemployment benefits represent the most important component 
driving short-term PTRs. For instance, Luxembourg is by far the country with the highest contribution of 
unemployment benefits to total short-term PTRs (over 70 percentage points), followed by Finland, Sweden, 
France, and Portugal (over 50 percentage points). Luxembourg and Sweden are characterised by high gross 
replacement rates for short unemployment durations (e.g. around 80 percent of previous wages). In Finland, most 
employees are covered by generous unemployment insurance in terms of benefits amount and duration, and thus, 
would receive a relatively high unemployment benefit compared to previous employment income (Jara, 
Sutherland and Tumino 2016).  
Fig. 2 Decomposition of mean short-term PTRs by income source in 2017. Note: countries ranked by mean short-term 
PTR. See also alternative representation of results in Figure 10 in the Appendix. Source: own calculations using 
EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
 
At the other extreme of the distribution, in Slovakia, the UK, Malta, Hungary, and Poland, the contribution of 
unemployment benefits to short-term PTRs is the lowest in Europe (15 to 17 percentage points). In these cases, 
the results can be explained by the short duration of unemployment insurance benefits (e.g. only 3 months in 
Hungary), by low or flat-rate unemployment benefits (e.g. in the UK and Malta), by low caps to maximum 
unemployment benefits amounts (e.g. in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland), and by low levels of or limitations to 
unemployment allowances after the expiration of unemployment benefits. 
Other benefits, such as social assistance benefits, family benefits and pensions (mostly from other household 
members) play a comparably minor role. In general, the average contribution of social assistance benefits to total 
short-term PTRs is 3 percentage points. Countries with higher contributions are Romania, Denmark, Cyprus, 
Greece and the UK, where the higher importance of social assistance benefits on PTRs can be explained by the 
presence of guaranteed minimum income schemes that do not rule out eligibility for the short-term unemployed 
(Greece introduced a new guaranteed minimum income scheme in 2017). The contribution of other benefits is 
minor and mainly driven by family benefits. In Poland, the UK and Germany, family benefits account for between 
4 and 2 percentage points of short-term PTRs, respectively, but in almost all other countries, their contribution 
falls below 1 percent.  
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In some countries, high short-term PTRs are not only the result of unemployment benefits, but are also driven by 
reduced income taxes and social insurance contributions. This is the case, for instance, in Denmark, Belgium and 
Germany. All three countries have short-term PTRs above 70 percent and reduced income taxes and social 
insurance contributions account for up to 30 percentage points of total PTRs. In addition to Denmark and Belgium, 
the largest incidence of taxes and social insurance contributions to the short-term PTRs is observed in Greece, 
and, above all, Hungary (33 percentage points out of 52 percent total PTR). High contributions of reduced incomes 
taxes and social insurance contributions to short-term PTRs can also be found in Austria, Slovakia, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Italy and Latvia (27 to 25 percentage points). The relative importance of reduced income taxes (see 
Denmark, Belgium, Latvia, Ireland, Germany) vs. reduced social insurance contributions (Greece, Slovakia, 
Austria, Germany, Slovenia) varies in these countries. 
In summary, although we can observe a number of contribution-financed “Bismarkian” systems (e.g. Belgium, 
Austria and Germany), typically providing a relatively stable safety net in case of unemployment, (see Figari et 
al. 2011) among the countries with the highest incidence of reduced social insurance contriubitons and income 
taxes on PTRs, the composition is diverse and cannot be associated to a single typology of welfare-system. 
In general, the results show that labour market (dis)incentives seem to be associated with either benefits (e.g. the 
Netherlands) or taxes/social insurance contributions (e.g. Hungary), but rarely with both in most countries. It is 
interesting to point out that in Nordic countries and in several other European welfare states, benefits explain over 
70 percent of total short-term PTR. While this appears to be in line with the conventional wisdom that benefit 
dependency is triggered by generous replacement rates (Cappellari and Jenkins 2014; Hansen et al. 2014; Königs 
2014; Lalive 2007), we also find that the role of direct income taxes and social insurance contributions cannot be 
ignored.7 In fact, in at least half of the countries, income taxes and social insurance contributions account for at 
least 40 percent of short-term PTR (over 60 percent in Hungary, and between 52 percent and 57 percent in Poland, 
Slovakia and Czech Republic). This finding will become more apparent when considering long-term PTRs, as 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
Turning to long-term PTRs, Figure 3 shows that the results of the decomposition change substantially with respect 
to short-term PTRs. Reduced taxes and social insurance contributions have a larger incidence on long-term PTRs 
than short-term PTRs, accounting on average for 24 percentage points, out of 36 percent (the average long-term 
PTR across countries). The combined incidence of taxes and social insurance contributions on long-term PTRs is 
particularly high in Belgium, Hungary, Denmark, Slovenia, and Germany.  
 
7 Note, however, that we focus on people currently in work whereas people out of work are likely to have lower earnings 
potential and hence a greater benefit trap. An analysis of short-term PTRs for low earners only, i.e. a group likely to be more 
similar to those currently out of work, shows that social insurance contributions still contribute to short-term PTRs (12 percent 
on average) even for low earners while this is less the case for income tax (1 percent on average).  
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Fig. 3 Decomposition of mean long-term PTRs by income source in 2017. Note: countries ranked by mean long-term 
PTR. See also alternative representation of results in Figure 11 in the Appendix. Source: own calculations using 
EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
In most countries, unemployment insurance benefits have been exhausted and are replaced by follow-up benefits 
(e.g. unemployment assistance or social assistance). Comparing the decomposition of short-term PTR and long-
term PTR highlights the importance of considering the tax-benefit system as a whole, as different elements 
contribute to work incentives when unemployment duration matures. In Denmark, the high long-term PTR reflects 
the generosity of social assistance benefit, which is still able to provide at least half of a household’s disposable 
income after entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits has been exhausted. Fernandez Salgado et al. (2014) 
highlight the role of a developed social assistance scheme and the danger of falling below the poverty threshold 
if such a system does not exist. The relatively high value for Greece also likely reflects the introduction of the 
new guaranteed minimum income scheme. Other countries in which social assistance benefits matter in explaining 
long-term work incentives are Luxembourg and Cyprus, and to a lesser extent, the UK and Romania. In the case 
of Bulgaria, instead, the low long-term PTRs relate to the very low level of social assistance benefit available to 
people exhausting entitlements to unemployment insurance. The same is true for Lithuania. In Italy, the low value 
probably stems from the fact that the 2017 tax/benefit system does not yet include the new Italian guaranteed 
minimum income benefit (“Reddito di Inclusione”), introduced in January 2018; in the absence of last-resort 
safety nets, a substantial share of the long-term unemployed in Italy is left with very low or no incomes. 
Unlike Denmark, high long-term PTRs in several countries (e.g. Finland, Austria, Germany, Portugal, Hungary 
and Slovenia) do not result from particularly generous social assistance benefits, but rather from the effect of 
reduced taxes and social insurance contributions, and, in some cases (Finland, Austria, Ireland, Germany and 
Portugal), from generous unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed. In Finland, for instance, the high 
long-term PTR is mostly explained by high unemployment benefits, firstly, and secondly by reduced income taxes 
and social insurance contributions, while social assistance benefits have only a minor influence on long-term PTR. 
In fact, Finland maintains relatively generous unemployment assistance benefits even in the long-run, once the 
entitlement to the main unemployment insurance benefits is exhausted: as a result, unemployment benefits still 
account for 32 percentage points out of 55 (almost 60 percent) of the long-term PTR. Further, in Ireland, high 
unemployment benefits and reduced income taxes explain most of the long-term PTR (20 and 16 percentage 
points, respectively). In Germany, long-term PTR can be mostly explained by reduced income taxes and social 
insurance contributions, and, to a minor extent, by unemployment benefits. Similarly in Portugal, long-term PTR 
are mostly driven by unemployment benefits, and by reduced taxes and social insurance contributions. 
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In Hungary, on the contrary, the components that account the most for high long-term PTR are reduced taxes and 
social insurance contributions, rather than the generosity of last resort social assistance programmes or benefits 
for the long-term unemployed. Finally, also in Slovenia, high long-term PTR are mostly due to high social 
insurance contributions, and, to a minor extent, reduced income taxes. Slovenia also shows the highest 
contribution of social insurance contributions to total long-term PTR (21 percentage points) in the EU and the 
UK, followed by Croatia, Hungary, Greece, Slovakia and Austria.  
As in the case of short-term PTRs, other benefits only marginally impact on mean long-term PTRs. The countries 
where family benefits matter the most for long-term PTRs are Poland, the UK, Czech Republic and Slovenia. One 
possible explanation could be that, in these countries, some family benefits are designed as in-work benefits or 
tax credit and allowances, and therefore are lost when beneficiaries move from employment into long-term 
unemployment. Another possible explanation could be that these benefits entail last resort programmes 
specifically designed for households with children, where beneficiaries are long-term unemployed. The relatively 
larger effect found in Poland, could be explained by the generous child benefit “Family 500+”, launched by the 
government in 2016. In the remaining countries, the contribution of family benefits to long-term PTRs falls below 
2 percent. 
Overall, social assistance and other benefits (mainly driven by family benefits) represent the most important 
component of long-term PTRs in only a minority of countries (Cyprus, Finland and Ireland). In general, reduced 
taxes and social insurance contribution are actually more important determinants of long-term PTRs and in half 
of the countries they account for at least 70 percent of the total PTR. 
The role of taxes and social insurance contributions is even more pronounced when focusing on METRs (Figure 
4). Our decomposition exercise shows the relative incidence of taxes, social insurance contributions and (loss of) 
benefits to the mean METR. Higher taxes associated with higher earnings represent the most important component 
of mean METRs. Denmark registers by far the highest contribution of direct income taxes to average METR (44 
percentage points out of 46 METR), followed by Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Italy and Germany. On the 
contrary, in countries characterised by lower progressivity, such as Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, 
the contribution of taxes to the mean METR remains low, only between 15 and 8 percentage points.  
In Hungary, increases in social insurance contributions due to higher earnings explain over 19 percentage points 
of average METR. Other countries where high social insurance contributions explain an important component of 
METRs are: Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Austria, Greece, Belgium and Germany.  
Finally, loss of benefits associated with higher earnings seem to matter in the UK (9 percentage points), followed 
by France, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Ireland, the Netherlands, Romania and Slovenia. In the UK, the loss of benefits 
is associated with a reduction in means-tested benefits (in-work benefits and housing benefits), as income from 
labour increases. Like in many countries, low income earners are eligible for these benefits which are however 
lost after earnings increase by 3%. 
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Fig. 4 Decomposition of mean METR by income source in 2017. Note: countries ranked by mean METR. See also 




Overall, these results firstly suggest that various tax-benefit elements contribute differently to work incentives at 
the intensive vs. the extensive margin and secondly, may also be different for work incentives at the intensive 
margin when unemployment duration matures. It is furthermore important to note that while the role of taxes and 
social insurance contributions is obvious in the case of METRs, it also needs to be taken into account for PTRs.  
3.3. Heterogeneity across population subgroups 
An advantage of using representative data for the analysis of work incentives is that it allows us to compare 
indicators across different population subgroups. Tables 9-11 in the Appendix compare mean PTRs (short- and 
long-term) and METR for a wide range of sub-population groups. The following subsection discusses the most 
important differences between sub-population groups for each of the indicators.  
In terms of short-term PTRs, marked differences are observed between employees and the self-employed, across 
earnings quintiles, people at-risk-of-poverty, those at high risk of unemployment, and, to a minor extent, between 
age groups and type of earners (main vs. secondary). On the other hand, differences between men and women are 
very small across countries. This is partly explained by the nature of the indicator which captures changes in 
household incomes and the role of the tax-benefit system rather than the change in individual earnings. 
In general, employees face higher PTRs than the self-employed, since the latter are not always eligible for 
unemployment insurance benefits, or are subject to lower compulsory social insurance contribution rates. 
However, in a number of countries, the reverse is true: for example, in Hungary, the PTR for self-employed 
exceeds employees' by 39 percentage points because the self-employed are eligible for unemployment insurance 
benefits and face high social insurance contributions. 
Short-term PTRs are much higher for workers in the bottom vs. the top quintile of the earnings distribution. These 
differences can be explained by the existence of lower limits in unemployment insurance schemes (minimum 
payments amount for people satisfying eligibility conditions) and by access to out of work benefits, such as 
minimum income schemes (e.g. as in Greece) and other social assistance benefits. While high PTRs for the low-
paid reflect the degree of income protection provided by the tax-benefit system, overly high PTRs at the bottom 
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of the earnings distribution can discourage labour market participation among the poor, creating benefit 
dependence and unemployment traps. An alternative interpretation is that low earners in many countries can be 
eligible for the guaranteed minimum income scheme while working (see Appendix B), leading to similar income 
levels in and out of employment. In some countries, low earners face a higher incentive to work than top earners, 
due to important tax allowances and family benefits in the upper part of the earnings distribution, as in the case 
of Italy (where the gap between top and bottom earners’ PTR reaches 21 percentage points), Netherlands, Latvia, 
Germany, Romania and Slovenia. Interestingly, the level of work incentives for low paid workers is not 
necessarily reflected in PTRs for people facing high risk of poverty or unemployment. Short-term PTRs of the 
working poor8 are significantly higher compared to the overall sample and low earners in the majority of countries 
indicating a potential poverty-trap if they lose their job. On the other hand, high unemployment-risk workers have 
higher incentives to be employed than the overall population in the majority of countries. Their PTRs are 
considerably lower in two thirds of the countries. This might, however, be related to the difficulty of estimating 
the risk of unemployment based on cross sectional data.   
Differences in PTRs by skill, working hours and age levels are more difficult to interpret since they are more 
likely to be mixed up with differences associated with earnings: for instance, older workers might exhibit higher 
PTRs because they enjoy higher earnings, and therefore fall into higher tax brackets. The evidence actually shows 
that older workers face higher PTRs than younger workers in almost all countries (the difference reaching 20 
percentage points. in Slovenia and 16 in the Netherlands), with the exception of Malta and Greece. As far as skills 
groups are concerned, low-skilled workers tend to show higher PTRs than medium- and high-skilled workers in 
almost all countries, although the variation of PTRs across skills groups is relatively small. The evidence for part-
time workers is mixed. We observe larger disincentives for part-timers in several countries (e.g. Greece and 
Hungary) while in others (e.g. Italy, Romania, Latvia and Germany), part-time workers seem to face lower 
disincentives to work than full-time workers. This is mainly driven by lower social security contributions paid by 
this group. High PTRs for part-timers can be associated with eligibility for social assistance benefits given the 
usually low level of earnings received by this group. Finally, in general, main earners exhibit higher PTRs, which 
is related to the larger contribution of unemployment insurance benefits given that the latter are proportional to 
previous earnings in most countries. 
As far as long-term PTRs are concerned, we notice that the variation across sub-groups tends to decrease compared 
to short-term PTRs, and in some cases the results point in different directions. In contrast with short-term PTRs, 
in general the self-employed show higher long-term PTRs than employees. The difference between the short- and 
long-term scenarios reflects the role of unemployment insurance schemes in work incentives. During the first year 
of unemployment (short-term) employees face higher PTRs than the self-employed because in general the latter 
group is not covered by unemployment insurance. Once unemployment insurance has been exhausted (long-term) 
the self-employed exhibit higher PTRs reflecting a stronger contribution of social assistance to PTRs for this 
group. The gap between main and secondary earner PTRs tends to increase in the long-term. The main earners’ 
higher long-term PTRs are driven by two factors. On the one hand, the decrease in household disposable income 
is smaller in the case of unemployment of secondary earners compared to main earners meaning that the 
contribution of social assistance (and other means-tested benefits) to PTR would be smaller for secondary earners. 
On the other hand, taxes and social insurance contributions have a stronger incidence on long-term PTRs 
compared to benefits and their incidence would be larger for individuals with higher earnings (main earners 
compared to secondary earners). The results are in line with studies by Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Verdelin 
(2011) and more recently Bartels and Shupe (2018) and further highlighted in the results for the working poor. 
Their long-term PTRs are mostly in the same direction as for low-paid workers and considerably higher than for 
the overall sample. This shows that the potential of a poverty trap implicit in many tax-benefit system increases 
with the duration of unemployment. This is also supported by higher work disincentives for people with high risk 
of unemployment. Differing from short-term PTRs, long-term PTRs for this population subgroup are generally 
higher than for the overall sample.  
 
8 Working poor in this paper refers to someone in employment (i.e. with positive earnings) living in a poor household with 
less than 60% of the national median equivalised disposable household income. 
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In the case of METRs, the largest differences are observed between earning quintiles, people at-risk-of-poverty 
as well part-time vs. full-time workers. Earners in the top quintile of the distribution face higher METRs than 
those at the bottom in almost all countries, and the difference can reach more than 30 percentage points as in Italy, 
Greece, Ireland and Spain. Higher METRs at the top of the earnings distribution mainly reflect the progressivity 
of income taxes, with high earners paying a higher proportion of the additional earnings in taxes. Results 
furthermore show almost no difference between in METRs of employees and the self-employed, as well as 
between main and secondary earners, with a few exceptions.  
3.4. Low work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin 
While different population subgroups face different levels of work incentives in general, it is also useful to have 
a portrait of those facing low work incentives specifically. High levels of PTRs and METRs are an indicator of 
low incentives to work or to increase labour supply. In this section, we provide a cross-country comparison of the 
share and the characteristics of individuals facing low work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin (see 
Table 15-17 in the Appendix for the underlying data). 
In the literature, there is no consensus yet as for which level of PTR or METR should be regarded high enough to 
identify people as facing low work incentives. Two different approaches could be considered. On the one hand, a 
relative threshold could be defined for each country based, for instance, on the median value of each indicator in 
each country. This would allow taking into account the very different distributions of work incentive indicators 
across countries. However, from a cross-country comparative perspective, the relative threshold might be too low 
to characterise some individuals as facing low work incentives in certain countries. The different distributions of 
work incentives across countries and indicators furthermore lead to a wide variation of relative thresholds, which 
render cross-country comparison meaningless. Relative short-term PTR thresholds range from 37 percent in Malta 
to 105 percent in Luxembourg, relative long-term PTR thresholds vary between 25 percent in Cyprus up to 62 
percent in Finland, and MTR thresholds range from 15 percent in Cyprus to 66 percent in Belgium. In this sense, 
the definition of an absolute threshold seems more appropriate for a comparable characterisation of groups facing 
low incentives to work even if it neglects the variation in the dispersion of work incentives across countries. Given 
our focus on cross-country comparison, in this section we discuss the results based on an absolute threshold, but 
we provide the results based on relative thresholds in the Appendix (see Table 18-20). We follow an approach 
taken by Jara and Tumino (2013) who define the threshold as the average plus one standard deviation of the mean 
across all countries. In the case of short-term PTRs, the absolute threshold corresponds to a value of PTR equal 
to 75 percent. For both long-term PTRs and METRs, the value of the threshold is 50 percent. Both the share of 
those facing low work incentives and the underlying sample size are sensitive to the chosen threshold given that 
relative and absolute thresholds can be quite different from each other. Nevertheless, the portraits and patterns 
described in the following paragraphs remain essentially unaffected by the choice of threshold with the exception 
of the share of people at risk of poverty which is more sensitive to the applied threshold in selected countries. 
The share of workers facing high short-term PTRs varies widely across countries. In Latvia, Croatia, Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, less than 5 percent face a high disincentive to work, while the share is as high as 81 percent 
in France and 84 percent in Luxembourg. In more than half of the countries, the majority of people with low work 
incentives are women, particularly so in Italy and Ireland. Young workers (below 30 years old) are typically the 
least affected by low work incentives (with the exception of Malta). This might be related to age restrictions for 
the entitlement of certain benefits or to the fact that young workers may not fulfil eligibility conditions based on 
work history, for instance, for unemployment insurance benefits. In terms of skill groups, the majority of 
individuals facing high short-term PTRs are medium skilled, while low-skilled represent the largest share only in 
a small number of countries (Spain, Malta, Portugal, Romania and the UK). Those facing high disincentives are 
furthermore less likely to be self-employed (given that not all countries provide unemployment benefits for the 
self-employed) and more likely to be main earners (with the exception of Czech Republic, Italy, Malta and 
Poland). A very high share (more than 60 percent) are part-timers in Ireland, followed by Greece, Spain, Austria 
and the UK (with more than 40 percent). In terms of earning quintile groups, the largest share is made of 
individuals with low earnings in most countries, which might be related to the existence of lower limits for 
unemployment insurance benefits or social assistance (e.g. minimum payments amounts in both cases for those 
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satisfying minimum requirements). Especially in countries with very high shares of low paid workers among those 
facing low PTRs, people are also very likely to be at risk of poverty (with almost 100 percent in Latvia). The 
picture is rather different in Germany and the Netherlands, where individuals at the top of the earnings distribution 
are more likely to be among those with high short-term PTRs.  
The share of those with a high risk of unemployment is comparably low in many countries but quite pronounced 
in Latvia and Lithuania. Factors leading to low work incentives are not necessarily correlated with higher 
unemployment risks. Youth unemployment, for example, is higher than for the average population in many 
European countries (O’Reilly et. al. 2015) but the share of young workers among the low work incentive risk 
group is comparably low. In a similar vein, low education is a well-studied factor of lower unemployment risk 
(Riddell and Song 2011) which is only reflected in a small number of countries. This in turn also highlights that 
those at highest risk of unemployment are not necessarily those with the highest benefit entitlements in case of 
unemployment.   
There is also significant variation in the share of individuals affected by high long-term PTRs: Bulgaria and Italy 
have the lowest share of the working population affected by high long-term PTR (below 3 percent), while Finland, 
Denmark and Belgium, on the other end of the spectrum, show the highest incidence of high long-term work 
disincentives (affecting over 40 percent of workers). The portrait of those facing low long-term work incentives 
is similar to short-term PTRs in terms of individuals being more likely to be employees, middle-aged, main earners 
and low earners. In particular, countries with very high shares of low earners also comprise of high shares of 
people at-risk-of-poverty faced with low work incentives (Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania). About one third are 
furthermore at high risk of unemployment in Bulgaria, Lithuania as well as the Netherlands. Contrary to the case 
of short-term PTRs, men are more likely than women to face high long-term PTRs. This is also confirmed in 
results for part-time workers who are mostly women and constitute only a small group of those faced with low 
long-term PTRs in most countries.  
Finally, the share of people facing low work incentives at the intensive margin varies across countries but to a 
lesser extent if compared to the variation in the incentives at the extensive margin (except for Belgium). The share 
of workers facing low work incentives at the intensive margins (METR above 50 percent) ranges, in fact, from 
0.5 percent in Spain to 34 percent in Sweden, and reaches 81 percent in Belgium, which remains an outlier. The 
portrait of individuals facing low incentives at the intensive margin is quite similar to results for long-term PTRs. 
However, results by gender exhibit greater variation with more countries showing higher shares of women facing 
high METR (especially in the Czech Republic and Cyprus). The same result holds across earning quintiles, where 
high earners are the largest group facing high METR, especially in Greece and the Scandinavian countries. The 
high share of low earners in Baltic countries as well as Bulgaria and Romania is also reflected in a high share of 
people at risk of poverty. Except for Estonia and Romania, these countries plus the Czech Republic also present 
a high share of people with high risk of unemployment (above 40 percent). In addition, differences between 
employees and self-employed are more pronounced in most of the countries. In Lithuania, over 50 percent of part-
time workers face METRs above 50 percent, while in the rest of the countries, this percentage is much smaller, 
and particularly low (around 4 percent) in Italy and Hungary. 
Probit results (provided in Table 21 in the Appendix) show the extent to which differences by characteristics are 
actually correlated with differences in the composition of other factors. Overall, earnings levels and being 
employed as opposed to self-employed as well as being at risk of poverty seem to be the strongest explanatory 
factors for low work incentives. All other workers’ characteristics are significant though the magnitude of the 
effect seems smaller. In particular, the effect of gender is comparably small after taking differences in age, skill-
level, earnings and employment characteristics into account (especially in the case of METRs). 
3.5. Evolution of work incentives over time 
This final section analyses the evolution of work incentives between 2008 and 2017. We use the same EUROMOD 
input datasets for both policy years in order to control for changes in the population and employment composition. 
Thus, the discussed changes in work incentives capture the effect of policy changes (or to some extent also the 
result of no policy changes, if for example earning levels increase higher than minimum levels of unemployment 
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insurance benefits). In Figure 5, the left-hand side chart shows the change in the work incentives at the extensive 
and intensive margin, while the right hand-side shows the share of workers affected by low work incentives in the 
two periods.   
Work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin have remained rather stable in most countries. This is 
especially the case for METRs and long-term PTRs whereas larger changes are observed for short-term PTRs. 
The countries with the largest increases in short-term PTRs are Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Bulgaria and Estonia. 
The country with the largest decrease in short-term PTRs is Hungary followed by Romania. In Belgium, Portugal 
and Bulgaria, policy changes have also resulted in a larger group of people facing high short-term work 
disincentives. The same is true for Finland and Greece in terms of long-term PTRs.  
The drop by more than 10 percentage points in short-term PTRs in Hungary can be explained by changes to the 
unemployment insurance benefit. In fact, the maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits decreased 
from 9 to 3 months, and the maximum benefit amount changed from 120 percent of the minimum wage to the 
level of the minimum wage. Given that the benefit duration was below 12 months in both years, these changes 
had no effect on long-term PTRs. The changes in Romania are also mostly driven by the unemployment insurance 
scheme. However, contrary to Hungary, these changes are not the result of actual policy changes, but rather the 
consequence of the lack of uprate in the flat rate amount of the unemployment insurance benefit.    
Increases in work incentives at the extensive margin are also mostly attributed to changes in unemployment 
insurance benefits due to increases in the duration of the unemployment insurance benefit or the above wage 
increase of minimum and maximum benefit levels. Bulgaria increased the qualifying period which potentially 
increases the number of people eligible for the benefit in case of unemployment. Given that the unemployment 
insurance benefit is paid for less than a year in most countries, these changes had no effect on long-term PTRs.  
In Portugal, the main policy changes over time consisted of a reduction of both the qualifying period for 
unemployment insurance benefits and the benefit amounts. The group of unemployed people eligible for 
unemployment benefits was expanded to include people with less work experience, and, as a consequence, the 
group of people eligible for receiving unemployment benefits for a full year has increased. All together, these 
changes led to a substantial increase in work disincentives by almost 20 percentage points. At the same time, 
changes in unemployment assistance seem to have led to a decrease in long-term work incentives over time. 
Nevertheless, Portugal is still among the countries with the highest long-term PTR. 
Changes in tax and social insurance contributions have impacted changes in work incentives to some extent but 
have often been counter-balanced by other policy changes. In Estonia, changes in the tax system leading to higher 
disincentives have been balanced out by changes to the social insurance contributions. In Belgium, the increase 
in short-term PTRs would have been higher but was to some extent offset by changes to the tax system.  
Changes to various tax-benefit elements contributed to the increase in short-term PTR in Greece. The most 
important contribution to the increase of both short- and long-term PTRs was the introduction of the guaranteed 
minimum income scheme in 2017, a reform that substantially improved the safety-net of people in unemployment 
or unable to work. Despite the increase in long-term PTR, the share of workers exposed to high long-term PTR in 
Greece (around 30 percent), remains below those of countries with more generous social assistance systems for 
the long-term unemployed (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland). In Finland, on the other hand, changes 
towards a more generous social assistance scheme substantially increased the long-term PTR, crowning Finland 
as the country with the second highest long-term PTR. 
Fewer changes have taken place for work incentives at the intensive margin. The exceptions are Denmark and 
Hungary with decreases in METRs as well as Greece and Cyprus with increases. At the same time, the share with 
high METRs has changed in many countries with substantial decreases in Hungary - due to the change in tax 
system - but also in Germany. Increases are especially apparent in Finland and Ireland. 
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Fig. 5 Changes in work incentives and share with high work disincentives, 2008 vs. 2017. Source: own calculations 
using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
 
The substantial changes in Hungary are largely based on the shift to a flat-tax system. In Denmark, changes are 
also based on changes of the income tax system and more specifically on the abolishment of the medium tax 
bracket, an increase of the earned income tax and a reduction in several other taxes. Nevertheless, Denmark 
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remains one of the European countries with the highest METRs. Changes to the Greek tax and social insurance 
contribution system have increased disincentives not only at the extensive margin but also the intensive margin. 
Contrary to changes in the other three countries, changes in METRs for Cyprus can mostly be explained by 
changes in benefits. The previously universal child benefit was turned into a means-tested benefit which results 
in a loss of the benefit when parent’s earnings increase.  
Work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin have remained rather stable in most countries. This is 
especially the case for METRs and long-term PTRs while larger changes have taken place in terms of short-term 
PTRs. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper presents a cross-country comparison of work incentives at the extensive and intensive margin of labour 
supply in the EU and the UK. Our analysis makes use of the European tax-benefit model EUROMOD and 
representative household microdata to estimate short- and long-term participation tax rates (PTRs), and marginal 
effective tax rates (METRs) in 2017 for individuals currently in work. We show that the design of tax-benefit 
systems plays an important role in the level and distribution of work incentives and that the role of specific 
elements differs by country and indicator. The use of microdata allows us to characterise the mean level and 
distribution of work incentives at the population level and to identify groups facing low work incentives.  
Our analysis provides a number of interesting findings. First, there is a large variation in the distribution of work 
incentives, at the population level, across countries, highlighting the importance of using representative microdata 
in the analysis. Cross-country differences in the distribution of work incentives reflect, on the one hand, 
differences in the design of tax-benefit systems and, on the other hand, differences in the composition of the labour 
market across countries. Our results suggests that differences in work incentives are mainly driven by the design 
of tax-benefit policies. Second, our comparison of short- and long-term PTRs highlights the important contribution 
of unemployment insurance benefits to work incentives at the extensive margin, with short-term PTRs being on 
average 20 percentage points larger than long-term PTRs. Third, workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution 
face the highest short- and long-term PTRs, which might be related to the presence of lower limits for 
unemployment insurance benefits (short-term) or social assistance (long-term). At the intensive margin, the 
highest METRs are observed for high earners, which is most likely related to the progressivity of direct taxes in 
most countries. Finally, work incentives have remained quite stable over the last 10 years in most countries which 
can be attributed to a certain path-dependency of social policy. 
A closer look at the composition of work incentives across European countries has also highlighted relevant 
implications for the literature on benefit dependency on the one hand, and for policy design on the other. For 
instance, given that the benefit component of the short-term PTR is relatively low in countries like Slovakia, UK, 
Malta, Hungary and Poland, compared to the taxes and social insurance contributions component, it is unlikely 
that only addressing issues related to benefit levels would have a major impact on short-term work incentives. In 
fact, the literature on benefit dependency typically focuses on the implications of last-resort benefits levels and 
duration on the probability of leaving welfare (Cappellari and Jenkins 2014; Hansen et al. 2014; Königs 2014; 
Lalive 2007), while the potentially sizeable role of reduced taxes and social insurance contributions is typically 
neglected. The results presented could explain low incentives to work in countries where the level of social 
assistance benefits is quite low, but the reduction of income taxes and social insurance contribution following the 
exit from formal employment is more substantial (e.g. Bulgaria). These findings also have implications for 
countries where social protection benefits are subject to fiscal consolidation measures or spending reviews, given 
their potential disincentive effects on labour market participation. For this purpose, it would be important to 
quantitatively assess whether social assistance benefits are actually the main factor driving long-term PTRs. If, 
on the other hand, reduced income taxes and social insurance contributions appear as the main determinants of 
long-term PTRs, then policy measures aiming at reducing labour market disincentives should probably be more 
geared towards alleviating the tax burden on households at higher risk of falling into social assistance (e.g. low-
income households), especially in countries with high informality rates. 
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A couple of points related to our analysis deserve particular attention. First, our analysis focuses on the financial 
incentives inherent in the design of tax-benefit policies. However, individuals’ labour supply incentives and 
choices are also affected by other factors such as the demand side of the labour market. In particular, certain 
population subgroups might be constrained in the labour market (e.g. low skilled workers) and might, for instance, 
be unable to work more despite having low financial disincentives to do so (low METRs). Evidence from the 
literature on job polarisation has, for instance, shown that certain categories of jobs tend to disappear, meaning 
that certain workers will be constrained in terms of job opportunities (Goos and Salomons 2009; OECD 2015). 
Labour market regulations might also imply that employers might choose to reduce their risk of hiring certain 
types of workers. Additionally, the increase in non-standard forms of employment, such as self-employment, 
might in some cases be the result of inability to find suitable jobs as employees. Finally, other individual 
constraints such as caring responsibilities or health-related issues would also influence labour supply choices. Our 
indicators capture differences in work incentives across these groups due to the design of tax-benefit policies (e.g. 
self-employed not entitled to unemployment insurance) but they do not capture the possibility of individuals being 
constrained from entering employment. The integration of labour demand within labour supply models accounting 
for the role of tax-benefit systems remains an area to be further explored and represents an interesting direction 
for future research. 
 Second, it is important to note that, at the extensive margin, PTRs not only provide information about work 
incentives to give up work but also capture the degree of social protection provided by the tax-benefit system in 
the event of unemployment. As such, the role of the generosity and duration of out-of-work benefits should be 
considered not only from the perspective of work incentives but also from that of the provision of adequate social 
support to prevent people from falling into poverty. More generous and longer out-of-work benefits could, for 
instance, serve as mechanisms for people to find a better job match upon re-entry to the labour market. 
Providing a comparative and comprehensive analysis of work incentives across EU countries and the UK based 
on representative household data is a useful exercise, as it highlights the important differences in the distribution 
of work incentives associated with differences in tax-benefit systems. The characterisation of population 
subgroups facing low work incentives, provided in our analysis, can be considered a useful first step to discuss 
potential reforms to make work pay. From a technical point of view, a comparative analysis further provides a 
starting point to discuss what the most appropriate definition of low work incentive would be (i.e. setting a 
threshold, whether relative or absolute). Finally, the availability of work incentive indicators for a wide range of 
countries based on microdata would allow future work (re)assessing the relationship between the design of tax-
benefit systems and labour market outcomes, such as employment and unemployment rates, and female labour 
force participation, among others.  
References 
Adam, S., Brewer, M., and Shephard, A. (2006). “The poverty trade-off: work incentives and income redistribution in Britain”, 
Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Bartels, C., and Pestel, N. (2016). “Short- and long-term participation tax rates and their impact on labor supply”. International 
Tax and Public Finance, DOI 10.1007/s10797-016-9400-9. 
Bartels, C., and Shupe, C. (2018). “Drivers of Participation Elasticities across Europe: Gender or Earner Role within the 
Household?”. IZA Discussion-Paper No. 11359. 
Browne, J. (2012). Reweight2: Stata command to reweight data to user-defined control totals. 
Cappellari, L., and Jenkins, S. P. (2014), "The Dynamics of Social Assistance Benefit Receipt in Britain", In Carcillo, S., 
Immervoll, H., Jenkins, S. P., Königs, S., and Tatsiramos, K., editors, Research in Labor Economics: "Safety Nets and 
Benefit Dependence", Vol. 39, 41-79. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Collado, D., Cantillon, B., Van den Bosch, K., Goedemé, T., and Vandelannoote, D. (2019). “The end of the cheap talk about 
poverty reduction: the cost of closing the poverty gap while maintaining work incentives”, In Cantillon, B., Goedemé, 
T., and Hills, J., editors, Decent Incomes for All: Improving Policies in Europe, Oxford Scholarship Oline, DOI: 
10.1093/oso/9780190849696.001.0001.  
Decoster, A., Perelman, S., Vandelannoote, D., Vanheukelom, T., and Verbist, G. (2015). “A bird’s eye view on 20 years of 
tax-benefit reforms in Belgium”, EUROMOD Working Paper, EM 10/15. 
Eurofound (2017). In-work poverty in the EU. Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union. 
 24 
Fernandez Salgado M., Figari, F., Sutherland, H., and Tumino, A. (2014). “Welfare compensation for unemployment in the 
Great Recession”. Review of Income and Wealth. DOI: 10.1111/roiw.12035. 
Figari, F., and Matsaganis, M. (2016). “Making work pay: A conceptual paper”. Social Situation Monitor, Research Note 
3/2016. 
Figari, F., Salvatori, A. & Sutherland, H. (2011). “Economic downturn and stress testing European welfare systems”. In H. 
Immervoll, A. Peichl, & K. Tatsiramos, eds. Who Loses in the Downturn? Economic Crisis, Employment and Income 
Distribution. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Research in Labor Economics 32, 257–286. 
Gasior, Katrin, and Pasquale Recchia. 2019. “The Use of Hypothetical Household Data for Policy Learning – Comparative 
Tax-Benefit Indicators Using EUROMOD HHoT.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice. 
(see Supplemental Material). 
Goos, M. and A. Salomons (2009). "The polarization of the European labor market." American Economic Review 99(2): 59-
63. 
Hansen, J., Lofstrom, M., Liu, X., and Zhang, X.. (2014), "State Dependence in Social Assistance Receipt in Canada", In 
Carcillo, S., Immervoll, H., Jenkins, S. P., Königs, S., and Tatsiramos, K., editors, Research in Labor Economics: "Safety 
Nets and Benefit Dependence", Vol. 39, 81-105, Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Immervoll, H. (2004). “Average and marginal effective tax rates facing workers in the EU. A micro-level analysis of levels, 
distributions and driving factors”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No. 19, OECD: Paris. 
Immervoll, H., Kleven, H., Kreiner, C., & Saez, E. (2007). “Welfare reform in European countries: A microsimulation 
analysis”. The Economic Journal, 117, 1–44. 
Immervoll, H., Kleven, H., Kreiner, C. and Verdelin, N. (2011). “Optimal tax and transfer programs for couples with extensive 
labor supply responses”, Journal of Public Economics, 95: 1485-1500. 
Jara, H.X., Sutherland, H. and Tumino, A. (2016) “The role of an EMU unemployment insurance scheme on income protection 
in case of unemployment.” EUROMOD Working Paper Series EM11/16. 
Jara, H. X. and Tumino, A. (2013) “Tax-benefit systems, income distribution and work incentives in the European Union”. 
International Journal of Microsimulation, 6(1), 27-62. 
Königs, S. (2014), State Dependence in Social Assistance Benefit Receipt in Germany before and after the Hartz Reforms, In 
Carcillo, S., Immervoll, H., Jenkins, S. P., Königs, S., and Tatsiramos, K., editors, Research in Labor Economics: "Safety 
Nets and Benefit Dependence", Vol. 39, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 107-150. 
Lalive, Rafael. (2007) “Unemployment Benefits, Unemployment Duration, and Post-Unemployment Jobs: A Regression 
Discontinuity Approach.” The American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 108–112.  
Lohmann, H. and I. Marx, Eds. (2018). Handbook on In-Work Poverty. Cheltenham, UK, Edvard Elgar Publishing. 
Navickė, J., Avram, S., and Demmou, L. (2016) “The effects of reform scenarios for unemployment benefits and social 
assistance on work incentives and poverty in Lithuania”, OECD, Economics Department Working Papers No. 1310. 
O’Donoghue, C. (2011). “Do tax-benefit systems cause high replacement rates? A decomposition analysis using EUROMOD”. 
LABOUR, 25(1), 126-151. 
O’Reilly, J., Eichhorst, W., Gábos, A., Hadjivassiliou, K., Lain, D., Leschke, J., … Villa, P. (2015). “Five Characteristics of 
Youth Unemployment in Europe: Flexibility, Education, Migration, Family Legacies, and EU Policy”. SAGE Open. 
OECD (2015). Non-standard work, job polarisation and inequality. In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All. Paris, 
OECD Publishing. 
OECD (2016). “Tax and Benefit Systems: OECD Indicators”, http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages.htm 
Pirttillä, J., & Selin, H. (2011). “Tax policy and employment: How does the Swedish system fare”. CESifo Working Paper 
Series No. 3355. 
Riddell, C. W., and Song, X. (2011). “The impact of education on unemployment incidence and re-employment success: 
Evidence from the U.S. labour market”. Labour Economics, 18(4), 453-463. 
Sutherland, H., and Figari, F. (2013). “EUROMOD: the European Union tax-benefit microsimulation model”. International 
Journal of Microsimulation, 6(1), 4-26. 
  
 25 
Appendix A. Simulating transitions from work to unemployment with 
EUROMOD 
The approach used in this paper to calculate Participation Tax Rates (PTRs) consists in simulating transitions from 
work (employment or self-employment) into unemployment for all individuals with positive earnings in the 
microdata, and re-calculating their new household disposable income by means of the microsimulation model 
EUROMOD, hence capturing the implications of tax and benefit systems under their new labour market status. 
More precisely, we make use of EUROMOD to run two iterations in the tax-benefit system of each country. In 
the first iteration, EUROMOD simulates tax-benefit instruments and calculates household disposable income 
without making any changes to the input data. In the second iteration, we simulate transitions to unemployment 
by setting earnings to zero and adjusting the value of other labour market related variables9 for all earners in the 
input data, and use EUROMOD to recalculate household disposable income under this counterfactual scenario 
where earners would become unemployed.10  
In the case of households with multiple earners, household disposable income in unemployment – calculated in 
the second iteration – is simulated for each earner in turn. Consider for instance a dual earner household. First, 
household disposable income is simulated before any transitions to unemployment take place (first iteration). 
Then, we simulate a transition to unemployment for the first earner of the household (by setting their earnings to 
zero) and calculate household disposable income in case the first earner would become unemployed, keeping the 
labour market status of the second earner unchanged (second iteration for first earner). Finally, we simulate a 
transition to unemployment for the second earner and calculate household disposable income in case the second 
earner enters unemployment, keeping the original labour market status of the first earner unchanged (i.e. first 
earner in work) (second iteration for second earner). 
Once household disposable income in work and in unemployment have been calculated for each earner in the 
household, the PTR for each earner i in household h can be expressed as: 





   , 
where Ei represents gross earnings of individual i when they are in work, Yh
Wi represents household disposable 
income when individual i is in work (Wi), and Yh
Ui represent household disposable income when individual i is in 
unemployment (Ui). 
Two sets of PTR indicators are presented in the analysis: short-term and long-term PTRs. Short-term PTRs are 
calculated based on disposable income out of work over the first year of unemployment, meaning that 
unemployment insurance benefits are taken into account for those individuals eligible for these schemes. Long-
term PTRs are calculated based on disposable income out of work assuming that entitlement to unemployment 
insurance benefits has been exhausted, with social assistance most likely playing a larger role and taking into 
account entitlement to unemployment assistance, in countries where such schemes are available. 
A few assumptions are needed in the simulation of transitions into unemployment to calculate PTRs for those 
currently in work. First, the number of months in unemployment needs to be specified. Here, unemployment 
duration is assumed to be equal to months in work during the year before the simulated transition (as reported in 
the data). This assumption is made in order to compare disposable income in and out of work over the same period 
of time. Second, in order to simulate unemployment insurance benefits, information about contribution history 
needs to be provided. Here, we exploit information available in the data and we set the number of months of 
 
9 Months in employment are set to zero, labour market status is set to unemployed, hours of work are set to zero, sector of 
employment (public or private) is set to zero and firm size is set to zero. 
10 In countries where individuals in the data are observed to receive both unemployment benefits and earnings at the same time, 
an intermediate iteration is made, where the add-on runs the model after setting unemployment benefits in the data to zero. 
This is done to avoid having results which mix information on unemployment benefits from two different approaches: reported 
unemployment benefits and simulated unemployment benefits. The idea behind this intermediate step is to simulate 
unemployment benefits only for the corresponding period in which the person was in work. In practice, this step affects only 
a very limited number of observations. 
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contributions equal to the number of months in work before the transition, which is recorded over the last 12 
months. For instance, in order to be eligible for unemployment insurance in Bulgaria, an individual is required to 
have contributed 9 out of 15 months, while in Germany it is required to have contributed 12 out of 24 months. In 
our simulations we would consider a person in the data eligible if they have worked 9 out of 12 months before 
transition to unemployment in Bulgaria; and 12 out of 12 months in Germany (given that month by month 
employment information is available for the previous year only). For countries where the qualifying period goes 
beyond 12 months, for instance Lithuania where it is required to contribute 18 out of 36 months, we use 
information about working history since entering the labour market as an additional control. 
  
Appendix B. Main characteristics of tax-benefit instruments 
Table 2 Overview of income tax systems, 2017. Note: Monetary amounts expressed as share of annual median 
equivalised disposable income in each country. a Refers to the income that is not taxed either through a 0 tax 
rate at the bottom or a basic tax allowance. Regional tax schedule for Madrid described in Spain. The 
calculation of the basic tax allowance is based on the income level and includes a progressive element in 
Slovakia. For Sweden only government tax schedule included. Source: own elaboration based on EUROMOD 
country reports and European Commission Taxes in Europe database. Median equivalised disposable income 
table retrieved from Eurostat database on 27 February 2020.  









Tax credits Family-related tax provisions 
BE Family 46.6 163.5 25/50 Yes 
Part of taxable income 
transferrable to spouse, tax free 
amounts for family size and 
compostion 
BG Individual - - 10 (flat) No Children tax allowance 
CZ Individual - - 
15 (flat), plus an 
additional 7% for 
incomes exceeding the 
max. contributory base 
for SIC 
Yes 
Spouse tax credit, (refundable) 
child tax credit 
DK Individual 20.1 - 
10.08 (bottom income 




transferrable to spouse 
DE Family 38.8 1,128.4 0/45 No 
Child tax allowance, single 
parent tax allowance, 
deduction of childcare 
expenses 
EE Individual 20.5 - 20 (flat) No 
Tax allowance for children and 
for spouse  
IE Family 72.2 135.6 20/40 Yes 
Marginal relief for children, 
different tax rates and bands 
for lone-parents and single 
earner 





84.2 405.8 19/43.5 Yes 
Personal and familly 
allowances (for descendants 
and ascendants). Refundable 
tax credits for large families 
and lone parents, for taxpayers 
with disabled descendats or 
ascendants and for working 
mothers. 
FR Family 43.7 685.2 0/45 Yes 
Reduction for children at 
school and child-care fee 
HR Individual 7.6 35.2 24/36 No 
Personal allowance for 
children and other dependent 
relatives 
IT Individual 0.0 445.3 23/43 Yes 
Child, spouse and other 
dependants tax credits 
CY Individual 127.2 391.2 0/35 No - 
LV Individual - - 23 (flat) No 
Allowance for a dependent 
child, spouse or parent 
LT Individual - - 15 (flat) No Child tax allowance 
LU Family 28.0 496.7 0/42 Yes Tax bonus for children 





61.6 405.9 0/35 Yes Private childcare tax credit 
NL Individual 83.202865 279.28048 8.9/52 Yes 
Child allowance, single parent 
supplement 
AT Individual 43.7 3,972.0 0/55 Yes 
Child tax credit, child tax 







2.0 305.6 18/32 Yes Child tax credit 
PT Family 75.9 862.8 14.5/48.0 Yes 
Child tax credit and depedent 
parent tax credit. Personal and 
family allowances 
RO Individual - - 10 (flat) Yes Tax allowance for dependents 
SI Individual 0.0 535.4 16/50 Yes Family tax allowances 
SK Individual 0.0 469.3 19/25 Yes 
Spouse tax allowance, child 
tax credit 
FI Individual 68.9 297.8 6/31.25 Yes Child tax credit 
SE Individual 178.4 259.5 0/25 Yes - 
UK Individual 61.9 807.7 20/45 Yes - 
 
Table 3 Overview of employee social insurance contributions, 2017. Note: Monetary amounts expressed as share of 
monthly median equivalised disposable income in each country. Most  Danish  transfers  are  financed  through  
either  the  tax  system, the exception are the supplementary labour market pension scheme and voluntary flat-
rate contributions to the unemployment insurance and early retirement scheme. The ceiling in Luxembourg 
refers to long-term care contributions only. For Malta, the floor and ceiling refer to minimum and maximum 
payable amounts. Source: own elaboration based on EUROMOD country reports. Median equivalised 
disposable income table retrieved from Eurostat database on 27 February 2020. 
Country  Rate (%) Floor Ceiling Tax deductible 
BE 13 - - Yes 
BG 13.34 78.6 444.3 Yes 
CZ 11 - 566.4 No 
DK - - - - 
DE 20.775 - - No 
EE 3.6 - - Yes 
IE 4 73.6 - No 
EL 16 - 894.3 Yes 
ES 6.35 67.0 304.5 Yes 
FR 18.804 - 1,412.3 Yes 
HR 20 71.0 1,121.1 Yes 
IT 9.49 62.0 595.6 Yes 
CY 7.8 0.5 354.7 Yes 
LV 10.5 - 714.6 No 
LT 9 - - No 
LU 4.45 59.6 297.8 Yes 
HU 17 - - No 
MT 10 6.0 15.5 Yes 
NL - - - - 
AT 18.12 20.3 237.4 Yes 
PL 13.71 - 457.0 Yes 
PT 11 - - No 
RO 11 - - Yes 
SI 22.1 - - Yes 
SK 9.4 - 82.8 Yes 
FI 9.33 2.8 - Yes 
SE 7 0.4 - No 
UK 12 + 2 (if above upper earnings limit) 44.0 - No 
 
Table 4 Overview of self-employed social insurance contributions, 2017. Note: Monetary amounts expressed as 
share of monthly median equivalised disposable income in each country. Minimum base is applied to self-
employment income below. A minimum contribution of €500/year applies in Ireland. Rates differet by income 
level in France. The contribution base is not income related but is a lump-sum obtained as a percentage of the 
average gross wage of the previous year in Croatia and Poland. Source: own elaboration based on EUROMOD 
country reports. Median equivalised disposable income table retrieved from Eurostat database on 27 February 
2020. 
Country  Rate (%) Floor Ceiling Tax deductible 
BE 21 11.8 67.0 Yes 
BG 26.8 - 444.3 Yes 
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CZa 45 35.4 566.4 No 
DK - - - - 
DE 34.4 - - No 
EEa 39 49.0 798.2 Yes 
IE 4 20.1 - No 
ELa 26.95 + €10 monthly flat rate 89.4 894.4 Yes 
ESa 29.8 72.5 304.5 Yes 
FR     176.5 Yes 
HR 37.2 - - Yes 
IT 31.08 92.3 456.4 Yes 
CY 14.6 - 151.6 Yes 
LV 31.13 62.2 - No 
LT 30.8 0.0 301.0 No 
LU 37.5 59.6 - Yes 
HUa 40.5 91.2 473.6 No 
MTa 15 10.2 23.2 Yes 
NL - - - - 
ATa 27.68 + €9.33 per month flat-rate 20.3 276.9 Yes 
PL 31.9 - - Yes 
PT 29.6   - No 
RO 26.3 250.4 - Yes 
SIa 38.2 80.9 488.5 Yes 
SK 33.15 71.0 994.0 Yes 
FI 25.74 31.1 - Yes 
SE 28.97 0.4 - No 
UK £2.85 flat-rate per week 32.4 - No 
 
Table 5 Overview of unemployment benefits, 2017. Note: Contribution period refers to months of 
contributions/period in which contributions can be made. In Cyprus, eligibility is defined in terms of the 
amount paid in contributions 26 weeks before unemployment. Min. stands for presence of a floor in 
unemployment insurance (UI) payment. Max. stands for the presence of a ceiling in UI payment. UA – 
unemployment assistance; SIC – social insurance contribution. Source: own elaboration based on EUROMOD 

















(age < 36), 
18/33 (age ≥ 36 
& age < 50), 
24/42 
(age ≥ 50) 
65% falling to 40% of 
gross earnings, then 




No - Tax 
BG 9/24 
60% of gross earnings. 
Min. 
4-12 No - Neither 
CZ 12/24 
65% falling to 45% of 
net earnings. Min. & 
max. 
5, 8 or 11 Yes - Neither 
DK 12/36 
90% of gross earnings. 
Max. 
24 Yes - Tax 
DE 12/24 
67-60% of net earnings. 
Max. 




increases if UI 
received) 
EE 12/36 
50% falling to 40% of 
gross earnings. Min. & 
max. 




Fixed amounts based on 
previous earnings. Min. 
& max. 























70% falling to 50% of 
previous contributory 





Means-tested UA Tax and SICs 
FR 4/28 
40.4% of gross 
earnings + fixed 
allocation. Min. & max. 
Max. 
24(36) 




70% falling to 35% of 
gross earnings minus 
SICs. Min. & max. 
3-15 Yes - Neither 
IT 12/24 
75% falling to 60% of 
gross earnings. Min. & 
Max. 
10-12 No - Tax 
CY 6 
60% of basic insurable 
earnings + increases for 
dependents. 
6 No - Neither 
LV 12/16 
50-65% of gross 
earnings; reduces with 
length of unemployment. 
9 No - Neither 
LT 12/30 
Flat rate + 40% falling to 
20% of gross earnings. 
Max. 
9 No - Tax 
LU 6/12 
80-85% of gross 
earnings. Max. 
12 Yes - Tax and SICs 
HU 12/36 
60% of gross earnings. 




Tax and SICs 
MT 5/24 Flat rate. 6 
Yes if 
contributed SIC 
Means-tested UA Neither 
NL 26/36 weeks 
75% falling to 70% of 
gross earnings. Max. 
3-32 No - Tax and SICs 
AT 
12/24 
(age ≥ 25), 6/12 
(age < 25) 
55% of net earnings; 
Min., max. 




increases if UI 
received) 
PL 12/18 
Flat rate; reduced after 3 
months. Min. & max. 
6-12 Yes - Tax and SICs 
PT 12/24 
65% falling to 55% of 
gross earnings. Min & 
max. 
5-18 No Means-tested UA Neither 
RO 12/24 
Flat rate 
component + 3% to 10% 
of gross earnings. 
6-12 No - Tax 
SI 
9/24 (age ≥ 30), 
6/24 (age < 30) 
80% falling to 50% of 
gross earnings. Min & 
max. 
2-25 Yes - Tax and SICs 
SK 24/36 
50% of previous 
contributory base. Max. 






Basic component + 45% 
difference between net 
daily wage and basic 
allowance + 20% 
difference between daily 
wage and daily 
limit + child 
supplements. 
Min & Max 
13 Yes Means-tested UA 





80% falling to 65% of 
gross earnings. Min & 
max. 
12-15 Yes - Tax and SICs 
UK 24/24 
Flat rate depending on 
age. 
6 No Means-tested UA Tax 
 
Table 6 Overview of social assistance benefits, 2017. Note: Monetary amounts expressed as share of monthly median 
equvalised disposable income in each country. Maximum amount for a single individual. Source: own 
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elaboration based on EUROMOD country reports and MISSOC (March 2018). Median equivalised disposable 
income table retrieved from Eurostat database on 27 February 2020. 
Country  Name 
Max amount 
per month 
Income taxes and 
SICs paid on SA 
Eligibility 
if in work 
BE Leefloon / revenu d’integration sociale 44.7 Neither Yes 






CZ Allowance for Living 18.5 Neither Yes 
DK 
Kontanthjælp; Aktivering af kontanthjælpsmodtagere; 
Integrationsydelse 
79.4 Tax No 
DE Sozialhilfe 21.6 Neither No 
EE Toimetulekutoetus 14.8 Neither Yes 
IE Supplementary Welfare Allowance 9.2 Neither Yes 





Regional Minimum Income Schemes (Rentas Mínimas de 
Inserción) 
24.3 to 52.6 Neither No 
FR 












Subsistence benefit (Pomoć za uzdržavanje, Stalna pomoć, 
Zajamčena minimalna naknada) 
19.3 Neither No 
IT None at national level - - - 
CY Guaranteed Minimum Income (Δημόσιο βοήθημα) 37.6 Neither Yes 
LV 
Guaranteed Minimum Income (Garantētā minimālā 
ienākuma pabalsts) 
8.1 Neither Yes 
LT Social benefit (socialine pasalpa) 17.8 Neither Yes 
LU Social assistance (Revenu minimum garanti) 41.8 




HU Social Assistance (Szociàlis Segèlyek) 17.0 Neither No 
MT Social assistance (Ghajnuna Socjali)  33.5 Neither No 
NL Social Assistance 48.0 Both Yes 
AT 
Minimum Income Benefit (Bedarfsorientierte 
Mindestsicherung) 
40.3 Neither Yes 
PL (Permanent) Social Assistance 25.9 Neither Yes 
PT 
Social integration income (Rendimento social de inserção 
ou mínimo garantido) 
54.1 Neither Yes 
RO Guaranteed min income (Venitul minim garantat)  11.3 Neither Yes 
SI Social Assistance 26.5 Neither Yes 
SK 
Material needs benefit (Dávka v hmotnej núdzi a 
príspevky k dávke) 
29.0 Neither Yes 
FI Local authority income support 23.9 Neither Yes 
SE Social Assistance 19.2 Neither Yes 
UK Income support, Income-Based Jobseeker’s Allowance 18.9 Neither Yes 
Table 7 Overview of simulated other benefits. Note: the table gives an overview simulated family/education and 
pension/disability/health benefits but not all of them are affected by transitions from employment to 
unemployment or by increases in earnings. Source: own representation based on EUROMOD version H1.0 
 Family and education benefits Pensions, disability and health benefits 
Austria Child benefit and child tax credit, family bonus, child 
care benefit and supplement 
- 
Belgium Child benefits, birth allowance, child care allowance - 
Bulgaria Maternity benefits, child benefits, birth grant - 
Croatia Child benefit, parental and maternity leave benefit and 
allowance, birth grant 
- 
Cyprus Child benefit and supplement, birth grant, student 
grant 
- 
Czech Republic Birth grant, child benefit, parental allowances, income 
tax bonus 
- 
Denmark Child benefits, child family grant Old-age pension, supplementary pension, pension 
supplement 
Estonia Child care allowance, birth grant, child and family 
benefit, large family parent allowance 
Support for pensioners living alone 
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Finland Child benefit, child home care allowance, study grant Guarantee pension 
France Child benefit, birth grant, family support allowance, 
educational allowance, benefit for large families, 
benefit for young children 
Means-tested disability benefit and widow allowance, 
solidarity allowance for elderly 
Germany Child benefit, additional child benefit, maternity and 
parental leave benefit, education benefit 
Long-term care benefits from statutory accident 
insurance, disability pension, sickness benefit 
Greece Child benefit, large family benefit, civil servants' 
family benefit 
Compensations for survivor and old-age pension 
reduction 
Hungary Maternity grant, child raising support and child care 
allowance, child protection benefit, family allowance 
- 
Ireland Child benefit, maternity benefit, family income 
supplement, one parent family payment 
Illness and injury benefit, disability allowance, 
invalidity pension, widow pension, state pension 
Italy Newborn bonus, family allowances Social pension 
Latvia Maternity and paternity benefit, child birth benefit, 
child care benefit, family state benefit, parental 
benefit 
State social security benefit for survivor, old-age state 
social security benefit 
Lithuania Child allowance, birth grant, pregnancy grant, 
maternity and paternity leave benefits, student's 
childcare benefit, benefit for multiple birth families 
- 
Luxembourg Maternity allowance, education allowance, new 
school year allowance, child benefit 
- 
Malta Child allowance, social assistance for single parents Contributory pensions 
Netherlands Child benefit, family allowance State pension, survivor pension, care allowance 
Poland Child benefit, child birth supplement, child allowance, 
child care allowance, supplement for large families, 
lone parents, disabled chldren and starting school 
year, parental allowance 
(Special) nursing allowance, nursing benefit, 
complementary old-age pension 
Portugal Child benefit Social pension, contributory old-age pension 
Romania Family benefit, child raising allowance and support, 
child benefit, educational allowance 
Minimum social pension 
Slovakia Child benefit, birth grant, tax refunds, parental 
allowance 
- 
Slovenia Parental benefit and allowance, child benefit - 
Spain Child benefits, large family benefit, birth grand, 
multiple birth benefit, working mother refundable tax 
credit, working lone parent tax credit, working large 
families tax credit 
Widow/er’s pension complement, non-contributory 
old-age pension, pension complement benefit 
Sweden Child benefit - 





Appendix C. Tables and Figures 
 
Fig. 6 Short-term PTRs vs. unemployment rates in 2017. Note: average values shown. Source: own calculations using 




Fig. 7 Distribution of short-term PTRs in 2017. Note: countries ranked by mean short-term PTRs. Source: own 




Fig. 8 Distribution of long-term PTRs in 2017. Note: countries ranked by mean long-term PTRs. Source: own 




Fig. 9 Distribution of METRs in 2017. Note: countries ranked by mean METR. Source: own calculations using 




Fig. 10 Relative contribution of benefits vs. income taxes and social insurance contributions to mean short-term 




Fig. 11 Relative contribution of benefits vs. income taxes and social insurance contributions to mean long-term 




Fig. 12 Relative contribution of benefits vs. income taxes and social insurance contributions to mean METRs in 
2017. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
  
Table 8 Sample characteristics. Note: “low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or less, “medium-skilled” to upper and post secondary education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. 
“Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not have employment income.”Part-time” is defined as working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is 
the individual with the highest earnings in the household. High risk of unemployment (UE) refers to the 10% of the sample with the highest risk. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD 
version H1.0 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
N. of observations 5317  4617  7470  6452  10881  6264  4685  10599  11718  10258  5391  15926  4699  5652  4367  3915  7181  4387  10903  5701  11085  7910  6640  10611  6798  11892  6202  16654  
Population (1,000) 4336  3027  4649  2400  34800  609  1709  3487  17768  25273  1447  22236  365  871  1241  230  4098  173  7309  3779  13397  4027  8004  827  2389  2300  4482  25794  
% female 46.3 47.1 44.5 48.0 48.8 49.9 47.2 41.6 45.2 48.9 44.8 42.1 49.3 50.4 48.3 46.8 46.7 39.3 46.3 45.1 46.0 49.9 41.3 44.3 45.7 49.7 48.4 47.5 
% age (<30) 16.8 16.1 15.9 14.7 15.3 20.9 15.7 12.2 11.8 19.3 19.2 12.1 22.8 19.3 19.4 20.1 17.4 26.9 18.8 21.7 18.9 15.6 15.4 13.7 19.4 18.1 18.5 22.5 
% age (30-50) 59.3 56.7 59.5 55.6 55.6 51.1 58.8 65.3 64.4 58.0 57.6 60.7 56.5 52.2 51.4 62.1 54.7 51.5 53.4 53.4 57.8 61.3 63.6 65.6 57.9 52.0 52.8 52.2 
% age (50+) 23.9 27.3 24.6 29.6 29.1 28.0 25.5 22.6 23.8 22.8 23.3 27.2 20.7 28.6 29.1 17.8 27.9 21.6 27.8 24.8 23.3 23.1 21.1 20.7 22.6 29.9 28.7 25.3 
% low-skilled 12.4 13.2 3.3 15.3 6.3 11.3 15.3 20.8 33.5 12.7 10.0 29.5 15.8 9.2 4.8 29.7 11.8 42.4 18.1 11.5 5.6 49.8 27.6 9.3 2.5 11.1 10.2 45.5 
% medium-skilled 37.9 58.0 74.5 44.7 55.2 46.8 29.4 42.3 23.9 47.7 66.4 46.0 42.0 55.8 54.1 39.0 59.6 29.3 41.1 55.2 61.1 26.2 51.2 56.9 72.3 44.8 46.3 25.8 
% high-skilled 49.7 28.8 22.2 40.0 38.4 41.9 55.3 37.0 42.6 39.6 23.6 24.5 42.2 35.0 41.1 31.2 28.6 28.3 40.9 33.3 33.3 24.1 21.1 33.8 25.2 44.1 43.5 28.6 
% employee 91.1 91.5 84.0 95.9 94.7 99.0 88.1 69.1 90.1 94.9 90.5 77.2 89.8 96.2 94.9 95.6 92.8 91.0 91.5 90.9 87.7 93.3 77.7 90.8 87.4 95.1 98.0 88.1 
% self-employed 8.9 8.5 16.0 4.1 5.3 1.0 11.9 30.9 9.9 5.1 9.5 19.0 10.2 3.8 5.1 4.4 7.2 9.0 8.5 9.1 12.3 6.7 22.3 9.2 12.6 4.9 2.0 11.9 
% main earner 64.9 60.4 60.6 65.3 67.4 62.2 60.1 69.7 65.9 64.9 61.0 67.9 61.4 60.3 61.7 63.0 62.9 58.4 63.8 62.5 59.3 62.4 61.5 60.7 54.0 65.5 64.0 62.0 
% secondary earner 35.1 39.6 39.4 34.7 32.6 37.8 39.9 30.3 34.1 35.1 39.0 32.1 38.6 39.7 38.3 37.0 37.1 41.6 36.2 37.5 40.7 37.6 38.5 39.3 46.0 34.5 36.0 38.0 
% part-time 15.1 5.9 4.6 10.6 17.8 8.1 27.3 15.5 18.8 13.3 5.0 15.6 15.9 9.6 7.0 17.3 8.1 8.2 30.2 18.3 7.1 6.5 3.9 7.3 3.4 11.7 8.2 19.6 
average working 
hours 
38.2 41.0 41.8 38.1 37.8 40.3 35.1 41.6 38.1 38.0 41.1 37.4 37.7 39.6 39.4 38.3 39.3 39.9 33.1 38.3 41.8 41.4 40.7 40.3 41.2 39.5 39.7 36.5 
poverty risk 2.8 9.0 5.2 4.0 5.9 9.7 3.3 9.4 14.1 3.5 6.7 10.9 10.1 10.5 9.6 8.1 12.6 4.2 6.1 7.2 8.2 8.7 15.7 8.2 4.7 3.8 6.2 3.5 




Table 9 Mean short-term PTRs by population subgroups in 2017 (in percent). Note: “Low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or less, “medium-skilled” to upper and post secondary 
education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. “Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not have employment income.”Part-time” is defined as 
working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is the individual with the highest earnings in the household. High risk of unemployment (UE) refers to the 10% of the sample with the 
highest risk. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
All 74.3 61.8 49.4 75.2 70.8 51.4 47.5 61.7 49.8 77.3 53.9 56.6 43.4 53.2 43.3 82.8 51.1 38.8 64.0 68.3 46.4 74.0 44.4 59.0 48.6 70.6 66.9 45.0 
Male 72.7 60.7 48.8 72.8 72.5 51.1 46.6 60.7 49.5 76.9 53.2 54.3 44.1 53.3 43.2 82.0 51.1 39.2 65.9 67.3 46.1 72.1 45.3 58.8 49.7 70.6 66.0 44.9 
female 76.2 63.0 50.0 77.9 69.0 51.7 48.6 63.2 50.3 77.7 54.8 59.8 42.7 53.0 43.3 83.7 51.1 38.3 61.8 69.5 46.8 76.0 43.2 59.3 47.3 70.7 67.8 45.1 
age (<30) 77.4 49.5 43.8 68.2 68.8 46.6 42.8 70.3 51.7 75.8 42.1 50.7 38.5 47.7 42.5 72.6 53.8 48.5 51.1 68.1 41.8 64.5 42.7 42.4 43.0 70.5 67.3 40.2 
age (30-50) 73.8 64.4 47.6 76.1 71.6 53.8 47.6 61.5 49.9 77.5 56.8 56.2 45.5 54.5 42.8 85.6 47.2 35.2 66.5 69.9 45.9 76.5 44.6 60.0 50.2 70.9 66.9 48.0 
age (50+) 73.6 63.5 57.3 77.1 70.4 50.6 50.3 57.8 48.9 78.0 56.5 60.1 43.1 54.5 44.6 84.5 57.0 35.5 67.8 65.1 51.4 73.9 45.0 67.3 49.2 70.2 66.6 43.0 
low-skilled 77.6 59.4 49.7 72.8 69.2 51.0 49.5 65.1 53.6 78.9 59.8 54.5 49.6 50.3 48.8 84.5 53.2 41.4 64.7 74.2 51.9 75.5 41.1 64.6 48.8 71.7 70.9 46.3 
medium-skilled 75.3 62.8 50.0 77.5 71.0 52.7 47.9 63.2 50.6 77.2 54.7 57.4 45.0 52.5 45.4 83.0 52.0 39.0 64.1 69.2 48.0 73.3 46.0 59.9 48.8 70.7 67.6 43.9 
high-skilled 72.8 60.9 47.1 73.7 70.8 50.0 46.8 58.1 46.5 76.7 49.1 57.6 39.5 55.0 39.8 81.0 48.4 34.9 63.5 64.7 42.6 71.6 45.0 56.1 48.0 70.3 65.2 43.9 
employee 76.5 64.2 47.2 75.1 72.4 51.2 47.2 63.1 48.7 78.9 53.8 64.2 44.0 54.2 43.7 82.3 48.3 38.8 68.1 70.0 45.4 76.1 50.1 57.4 46.3 70.6 66.3 46.2 
self-employed 51.9 35.9 60.9 78.3 41.9 66.8 50.3 58.6 60.4 47.2 54.9 35.4 38.2 27.9 35.0 94.7 87.6 39.4 19.7 51.6 53.4 45.5 24.8 74.8 64.8 71.4 94.8 36.0 
main earner 74.4 64.3 49.7 73.1 72.2 52.9 50.1 60.0 50.7 77.3 54.5 56.8 46.5 56.1 43.0 85.1 49.5 36.8 68.4 69.7 45.7 75.6 46.7 59.1 50.6 71.6 65.7 48.1 
secondary earner 74.2 58.0 48.9 79.2 67.9 48.8 43.6 65.7 48.3 77.1 52.9 56.2 38.4 48.8 43.7 79.0 53.7 41.8 56.3 66.1 47.5 71.4 40.8 59.0 46.3 68.8 69.0 39.8 
part-timer 80.2 54.3 51.3 80.1 61.4 50.7 51.1 81.2 57.6 77.3 51.2 46.5 40.7 43.6 47.7 81.4 63.6 48.7 62.2 73.1 49.3 68.6 34.6 63.6 47.5 72.8 63.0 49.1 
earnings Q1 71.4 47.4 52.7 80.5 57.8 56.2 54.6 87.1 73.1 72.0 46.2 39.1 39.9 38.8 54.6 73.3 64.0 57.0 53.0 70.9 55.1 63.4 29.4 64.9 49.1 70.1 76.0 50.1 
earnings Q2 75.8 63.2 49.7 81.0 70.6 50.7 46.7 62.7 55.1 79.9 58.5 52.9 51.2 53.0 44.0 86.2 51.2 41.0 57.1 72.4 51.4 73.8 49.5 57.4 47.4 70.6 72.4 43.9 
earnings Q3 79.5 65.1 49.4 76.2 73.4 49.8 43.8 56.7 46.5 78.2 60.0 60.6 45.5 55.4 44.6 86.8 49.8 36.7 63.1 67.5 46.8 76.4 49.8 60.9 48.3 71.5 66.9 44.3 
earnings Q4 75.3 65.1 49.6 72.2 75.3 51.6 45.0 53.4 44.2 77.9 53.9 63.8 40.4 57.4 41.9 88.3 48.4 32.7 70.9 67.9 42.7 82.8 48.1 58.6 48.8 71.4 61.4 43.4 
earnings Q5 69.3 62.6 45.9 66.8 74.6 49.6 48.6 50.4 40.3 76.7 48.6 60.3 39.4 57.6 34.6 78.9 45.0 30.4 72.9 63.6 37.6 72.7 44.3 54.8 49.4 69.3 59.4 43.7 
poverty risk 86.5 62.2 69.1 87.3 61.6 72.1 76.3 86.8 78.9 69.1 58.3 37.6 64.5 54.8 62.8 93.6 65.6 64.1 59.8 93.7 61.9 80.3 39.4 72.3 72.3 81.8 83.9 66.2 
high risk of UE 80.5 55.7 50.1 68.2 69.1 45.6 46.8 66.6 54.6 75.2 44.4 49.1 36.8 50.3 46.0 79.7 52.3 44.2 62.0 73.7 45.4 72.2 44.2 52.8 43.3 71.6 71.3 49.3 
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Table 10 Mean long-term PTRs by population subgroups in 2017 (in percent). Note: “Low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or below, “medium-skilled” to upper and post secondary 
education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. “Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not have employment income.”Part-time” is defined as 
working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is the individual with the highest earnings in the household. High risk of unemployment (UE) refers to the 10% of the sample with the 
highest risk. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
all 48.1 25.3 34.8 56.8 43.5 34.5 44.2 45.8 32.1 39.9 28.7 24.1 30.7 30.2 24.8 43.6 41.5 34.9 32.7 47.8 33.9 42.3 29.1 39.6 37.8 56.0 30.7 35.7 
male 48.9 25.4 34.9 57.7 46.0 34.4 46.7 47.8 33.3 41.6 28.4 24.6 33.2 30.2 26.1 45.7 41.6 36.2 36.5 51.3 33.7 43.1 31.0 40.5 39.7 56.0 32.8 39.3 
female 47.3 25.2 34.8 55.8 41.0 34.7 41.3 43.0 30.8 38.2 29.1 23.5 28.1 30.3 23.4 41.3 41.3 32.8 28.3 43.5 34.1 41.5 26.5 38.6 35.6 56.0 28.4 31.8 
age (<30) 50.6 24.7 32.5 65.8 46.8 35.0 47.2 50.1 23.7 36.8 27.8 19.7 25.0 28.9 27.8 33.1 50.5 45.6 37.4 53.9 30.6 35.4 34.8 36.8 36.5 59.2 27.4 34.1 
age (30-50) 47.2 26.2 35.8 57.2 43.3 35.0 43.5 44.5 32.9 41.0 29.1 23.6 32.2 30.3 25.2 46.0 39.1 30.6 30.1 47.4 36.0 43.8 28.0 40.8 38.9 55.6 31.5 37.8 
age (50+) 48.9 23.9 34.0 51.6 42.4 33.4 43.9 47.3 34.4 39.8 28.7 27.3 32.7 31.0 22.0 47.2 40.6 31.7 34.5 43.3 31.4 43.1 28.1 37.9 36.3 54.7 31.3 32.9 
low-skilled 48.3 33.1 34.8 59.5 48.1 37.7 45.7 52.5 33.8 41.3 26.9 19.7 41.3 31.8 34.8 46.4 43.3 36.7 36.5 52.1 35.3 46.3 30.1 39.6 37.5 59.8 32.9 35.9 
medium-skilled 47.0 24.7 35.0 57.9 44.1 36.5 44.8 46.1 31.9 40.9 28.0 24.0 31.8 30.3 24.5 41.1 41.7 35.1 33.2 47.2 34.1 39.0 28.2 39.5 37.9 57.2 30.1 35.2 
high-skilled 49.0 23.0 34.1 54.5 42.0 31.5 43.4 41.8 31.0 38.2 31.6 29.7 25.6 29.8 24.0 44.2 40.3 31.9 30.5 47.2 33.3 37.7 30.0 39.9 37.6 53.8 30.8 36.0 
employee 47.8 24.3 32.3 56.7 43.6 34.2 43.3 40.1 29.0 39.5 28.2 22.2 29.8 30.3 24.2 43.2 39.0 34.4 33.9 47.4 34.0 42.1 30.3 39.0 33.9 55.2 30.2 35.7 
self-employed 51.9 35.9 48.2 59.4 41.9 66.8 50.3 58.6 60.4 47.2 33.3 35.3 38.2 27.9 35.0 51.8 72.8 39.4 19.7 51.6 33.0 45.5 24.8 45.7 64.8 70.7 55.5 36.0 
main earner 50.4 26.6 36.4 58.3 45.5 36.1 47.8 47.5 34.8 42.1 29.0 23.9 36.9 33.4 28.0 50.6 39.9 34.0 38.0 54.2 34.3 49.8 31.6 42.2 41.2 57.6 34.8 42.5 
secondary earner 44.0 23.3 32.3 53.9 39.4 32.0 38.6 41.9 26.9 35.9 28.3 24.6 20.7 25.4 19.6 31.7 44.2 36.2 23.3 37.1 33.3 30.0 25.2 35.7 33.9 53.0 23.5 24.7 
part-timer 46.7 36.2 41.6 66.2 36.0 38.4 44.1 52.5 34.7 36.7 30.6 13.7 31.2 29.7 27.8 39.8 53.3 37.5 30.2 42.7 34.3 46.7 31.8 42.8 39.8 65.2 28.6 30.5 
earnings Q1 48.4 33.2 41.9 74.4 39.3 46.0 50.3 63.3 48.8 34.2 29.3 16.4 32.9 30.3 31.9 36.9 54.7 48.8 38.3 55.2 33.8 47.0 27.5 43.2 42.5 65.8 28.5 31.6 
earnings Q2 45.3 25.2 33.4 56.7 46.6 38.5 42.0 43.4 33.4 42.1 26.6 16.1 37.0 30.4 20.5 45.8 41.5 36.9 28.6 46.9 35.4 45.9 27.6 39.0 35.1 57.1 29.9 33.4 
earnings Q3 47.6 24.6 33.0 53.7 44.0 33.1 39.5 40.3 27.0 42.2 26.5 21.0 30.7 30.0 23.2 46.3 38.7 33.5 29.3 47.0 34.7 39.6 29.5 38.5 37.0 53.6 28.9 36.7 
earnings Q4 48.4 23.3 33.1 50.4 43.9 30.3 42.6 40.5 27.5 40.1 28.7 27.2 26.0 30.2 24.8 42.9 37.7 29.6 31.9 45.9 33.5 38.2 30.2 37.9 37.1 52.6 29.0 37.0 
earnings Q5 51.0 23.4 33.4 50.6 43.2 27.2 47.2 43.0 30.8 39.2 32.7 36.4 27.4 30.3 25.6 46.0 37.8 28.4 36.6 45.9 32.2 41.5 30.5 40.5 37.9 53.0 36.8 39.5 
poverty risk 77.0 41.8 63.2 96.4 51.7 65.4 82.8 72.3 61.7 38.5 35.8 13.2 61.6 47.5 45.4 75.0 57.9 60.4 44.6 93.5 37.4 83.2 35.7 65.0 71.8 80.3 46.7 59.7 
high risk of UE 60.1 33.7 41.1 68.2 49.8 36.7 53.6 50.4 34.9 37.2 29.7 18.4 23.8 37.7 36.8 48.2 47.3 36.3 48.8 53.3 32.6 56.7 34.8 43.5 37.6 63.6 30.6 37.8 
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Table 11 Mean METRs by population subgroups in 2017 (in percent). Note: “Low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or below, “medium-skilled” to upper and post secondary 
education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. “Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not have employment income.”Part-time” is defined as 
working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is the individual with the highest earnings in the household. High risk of unemployment (UE) refers to the 10% of the sample with the 
highest risk. “.” omitted due to data difficulties. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
all 54.2 21.9 28.5 46.0 45.3 23.1 41.2 32.6 23.5 39.5 28.1 40.2 23.4 31.1 26.6 43.7 29.1 25.8 41.3 42.3 29.5 31.0 33.0 39.7 32.8 45.6 38.7 38.9 
male 54.9 21.8 29.3 47.1 45.4 23.2 42.5 35.0 24.2 40.1 28.0 41.8 23.4 31.0 26.9 43.5 28.1 26.4 46.0 44.8 28.4 31.3 33.5 39.8 33.5 47.2 41.5 40.2 
female 53.5 22.0 27.6 44.7 45.2 23.1 39.6 29.3 22.6 38.8 28.1 38.0 23.4 31.3 26.3 44.0 30.2 24.9 35.9 39.2 30.6 30.6 32.3 39.5 31.9 44.1 35.8 37.5 
age (<30) 52.9 22.7 26.6 43.1 43.6 23.4 26.8 23.6 15.9 39.4 26.8 32.5 16.9 31.2 27.2 37.6 31.0 27.2 37.0 39.2 30.0 24.9 37.8 35.8 30.9 43.9 29.8 33.7 
age (30-50) 54.6 22.0 29.1 46.7 45.7 23.3 44.4 33.5 23.8 39.1 27.9 40.9 25.3 31.0 25.8 44.8 27.3 25.5 42.3 42.7 30.0 32.3 31.8 40.4 33.6 46.1 40.5 42.1 
age (50+) 54.3 21.1 28.3 46.2 45.6 22.5 42.4 35.0 26.4 40.5 29.6 42.0 25.3 31.2 27.7 46.9 31.4 24.9 42.4 44.0 27.6 31.6 33.1 39.9 32.3 45.8 41.1 36.9 
low-skilled 53.0 26.2 29.2 44.4 47.9 23.1 39.2 27.0 17.9 42.5 22.4 36.5 28.3 32.2 28.5 41.8 30.4 24.9 38.4 40.2 28.6 27.0 36.4 40.0 32.4 43.4 36.8 39.4 
medium-skilled 53.6 21.8 28.2 44.8 45.6 23.3 35.3 31.6 23.3 39.8 26.7 40.6 22.2 31.0 26.7 42.8 24.1 26.5 40.1 41.5 29.1 31.5 31.7 39.1 32.8 44.2 37.2 37.8 
high-skilled 55.0 20.1 29.4 47.9 44.6 22.9 44.8 37.0 28.0 38.1 34.3 43.8 22.8 31.1 26.3 46.9 38.9 26.5 43.9 44.2 30.3 38.6 31.7 40.7 32.6 47.7 40.7 39.2 
employee 54.7 21.1 29.2 46.1 45.4 23.0 41.4 31.4 24.3 39.0 30.0 41.3 23.2 31.5 26.8 43.4 29.6 25.8 42.3 41.7 31.9 31.8 32.1 41.2 30.6 45.6 38.2 39.1 
self-employed 49.4 30.8 25.0 43.6 43.9 33.8 39.2 35.5 16.3 48.0 9.5 42.3 24.9 20.8 23.9 51.2 22.6 26.1 31.3 48.4 11.9 19.7 36.1 24.4 47.6 46.9 63.1 37.4 
main earner 55.1 21.9 30.8 47.9 46.8 24.2 45.7 35.8 24.8 41.5 28.5 42.5 26.3 31.6 27.6 46.7 27.3 27.2 46.8 46.5 29.3 32.2 32.7 43.1 34.4 48.2 42.6 43.9 
secondary earner 52.6 21.8 25.1 42.4 42.2 21.4 34.2 25.3 21.0 35.7 27.4 35.2 18.7 30.3 25.1 38.7 32.2 23.9 31.8 35.2 29.6 29.0 33.5 34.4 30.8 40.7 31.9 30.8 
part-timer 48.6 30.4 14.9 41.7 43.7 22.7 32.0 21.6 12.9 42.5 19.4 21.1 25.9 30.3 25.5 45.0 . 20.0 31.5 35.5 32.5 21.1 46.1 36.1 27.3 42.6 31.5 35.5 
earnings Q1 40.4 27.1 14.9 40.9 42.5 25.4 23.3 14.9 7.0 43.0 17.1 15.7 36.7 29.4 22.4 42.1 18.4 19.2 30.7 33.6 27.3 20.1 40.2 28.8 32.3 37.7 30.2 32.5 
earnings Q2 60.6 21.5 31.8 43.1 46.7 22.6 33.7 21.5 10.1 43.0 20.1 32.4 20.1 30.9 25.2 41.4 19.1 24.7 23.9 40.1 31.5 23.0 28.7 43.5 33.3 41.7 31.5 43.3 
earnings Q3 55.0 21.6 30.9 44.5 45.5 22.6 41.8 38.1 24.5 37.1 30.5 41.3 10.7 32.2 30.9 40.4 25.3 30.5 47.9 43.6 29.5 28.3 32.4 38.6 31.7 46.0 31.6 39.2 
earnings Q4 55.1 21.2 31.5 45.3 47.1 22.6 50.0 39.9 30.0 35.6 30.9 52.6 19.8 31.9 29.2 47.0 39.9 26.8 50.1 45.9 29.0 37.5 33.2 40.7 32.3 48.6 42.1 36.3 
earnings Q5 58.4 20.1 32.1 55.5 44.4 22.8 54.3 47.6 37.6 39.8 38.5 49.7 33.1 30.7 24.2 47.7 39.8 26.7 51.0 46.1 29.7 44.7 30.8 44.2 34.2 52.4 56.6 42.9 
poverty risk 42.0 29.4 21.7 39.2 55.3 32.9 25.0 24.2 4.4 47.3 20.0 20.8 41.0 32.8 29.6 69.3 . 27.2 39.4 61.5 26.1 27.2 44.2 52.9 47.2 55.8 43.8 52.9 




Table 12 Reweighted mean short-term PTRs in 2017 (in percent). Note: Rows show the work incentive of the country in the row header based on the reweighted population of the column header 
under a fixed tax-benefit system. Each column shows the work incentive of the country in the column header with fixed population characteristics but the tax-benefit system of the row 
header. The diagonal shows the original work incentive. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
BE 74.3 75.7 74.7 75.4 76.1 75.5 73.5 70.4 73.9 75.1 75.3 72.9 74.6 75.3 74.8 76.7 75.4 76.5 74.0 75.1 72.6 76.3 71.7 74.9 74.8 73.9 75.0 75.8 
BG 61.2 61.8 60.5 63.3 63.0 61.8 60.8 56.0 60.1 61.6 60.7 58.9 60.4 61.0 61.4 61.6 61.5 59.8 60.4 59.3 57.3 61.3 59.1 61.7 60.2 61.0 62.4 60.6 
CZ 48.5 49.0 49.4 49.1 48.9 48.9 48.8 51.3 50.5 48.6 48.6 50.9 48.4 49.3 49.3 48.8 49.0 49.9 49.8 49.1 50.6 51.4 51.8 48.1 49.1 49.2 49.1 50.7 
DK 74.3 74.9 75.5 75.2 74.5 74.2 75.0 75.8 74.0 74.9 75.2 74.9 75.3 74.9 75.1 73.4 75.0 72.9 75.1 74.6 75.6 73.6 77.5 74.6 75.1 75.1 75.3 73.8 
DE 69.6 69.6 68.4 70.6 70.8 70.0 69.2 64.9 67.6 69.7 69.3 67.1 68.9 69.4 69.3 69.9 69.5 69.2 68.6 69.2 66.8 68.2 68.0 69.8 68.4 69.2 70.2 68.4 
EE 51.2 52.1 52.4 52.0 52.3 51.4 52.1 51.0 52.3 51.8 53.1 53.0 52.2 51.9 51.9 51.6 51.9 53.8 51.6 52.2 51.7 53.2 52.0 52.5 52.3 51.9 51.9 52.7 
IE 46.8 46.8 46.9 46.7 46.5 46.1 47.5 48.1 47.4 46.8 47.2 48.3 46.9 46.2 46.4 45.8 46.7 48.3 46.7 46.1 46.5 47.3 48.5 46.8 46.8 46.9 46.3 47.2 
EL 60.4 61.4 60.4 60.6 59.9 60.0 60.3 61.7 62.1 61.5 62.9 62.3 62.0 60.9 59.9 63.0 61.2 64.3 60.7 62.4 59.3 64.8 62.1 61.1 60.9 59.8 59.8 64.0 
ES 48.1 49.8 51.3 48.4 49.3 48.8 47.5 50.9 49.8 49.1 50.0 51.3 48.8 49.5 49.0 50.2 49.8 50.4 49.3 50.3 50.0 51.8 52.0 49.2 50.9 48.1 48.2 51.0 
FR 77.1 77.4 76.0 77.8 78.1 77.5 76.5 72.4 75.8 77.3 76.8 74.8 76.9 77.2 76.9 78.1 77.1 77.2 76.3 76.9 74.1 77.3 74.1 77.1 76.0 76.6 77.4 77.2 
HR 53.6 54.8 54.8 54.9 54.5 54.5 53.0 54.4 55.0 54.3 53.9 56.0 53.2 54.6 53.9 55.5 54.5 56.1 54.4 55.2 55.4 55.9 57.5 54.3 54.0 54.0 54.5 55.2 
IT 60.7 60.2 60.0 61.1 63.2 62.4 59.2 50.8 56.6 61.3 58.2 56.6 58.8 61.0 61.0 62.3 60.5 57.9 60.2 60.1 56.4 59.6 56.3 60.1 59.0 59.8 62.8 60.4 
CY 43.2 45.0 44.8 43.2 43.7 43.5 43.1 44.5 44.9 43.5 45.3 45.7 43.4 44.3 43.6 45.0 44.8 44.7 43.2 44.2 44.7 46.4 44.8 44.2 44.7 43.1 42.6 45.2 
LV 53.8 53.6 52.7 54.2 54.1 53.7 54.1 52.0 53.7 53.5 53.0 52.5 53.7 53.2 53.5 54.1 53.1 54.5 53.3 53.1 51.5 54.1 50.9 53.4 52.9 53.3 54.1 54.1 
LT 42.9 43.6 43.9 43.8 43.3 43.3 42.5 42.4 44.0 43.5 44.0 44.8 43.1 43.6 43.3 45.7 43.9 46.0 43.2 43.3 43.6 47.4 43.6 43.6 43.3 42.7 43.2 46.7 
LU 82.8 83.7 84.8 83.1 83.1 83.0 83.2 84.7 83.8 83.4 84.0 84.9 82.9 83.2 83.1 82.8 83.6 84.8 83.5 83.6 85.0 84.3 84.8 83.7 84.4 83.2 83.7 84.2 
HU 50.0 52.0 52.3 49.8 50.5 50.1 49.8 55.8 53.0 50.4 50.6 55.9 50.8 51.1 51.1 50.4 51.1 51.0 51.7 51.5 56.1 51.9 54.3 50.1 51.9 51.3 49.4 51.7 
MT 35.6 36.9 36.7 35.1 36.7 35.9 35.4 38.2 37.2 35.5 38.8 37.9 36.2 36.3 35.8 36.3 36.7 38.8 35.7 37.6 36.2 38.2 37.5 36.1 36.8 35.7 34.7 37.5 
NL 65.2 66.3 65.0 67.4 67.7 67.1 64.2 59.2 64.3 65.4 65.4 63.1 63.9 65.4 65.4 66.0 65.8 63.8 64.0 65.2 61.6 65.3 59.8 65.9 64.6 64.9 65.7 64.0 
AT 69.1 69.0 68.2 69.6 68.9 68.8 69.4 67.1 68.9 69.5 69.8 68.3 69.6 68.7 68.3 70.3 68.7 70.5 68.5 68.3 67.6 70.5 68.4 69.1 68.2 68.5 69.1 70.2 
PL 45.9 46.6 46.6 46.7 46.0 45.9 46.4 46.0 46.0 46.7 46.6 47.6 45.5 46.1 45.9 46.3 46.4 47.6 46.5 46.5 46.4 47.8 47.3 45.8 46.0 46.2 46.5 47.9 
PT 73.8 74.6 74.1 75.2 75.3 75.1 73.0 68.8 72.2 74.8 74.3 71.6 73.9 74.7 74.8 74.9 74.4 73.6 73.1 73.9 71.6 74.0 71.5 74.6 74.1 73.4 75.4 73.9 
RO 46.6 48.2 46.5 48.0 48.4 47.3 46.0 43.1 46.6 47.4 47.8 46.1 46.7 47.6 47.0 47.9 47.9 48.6 46.3 47.1 44.0 48.5 44.4 47.6 46.6 46.4 47.0 47.7 
SI 59.1 59.9 60.3 60.0 59.0 59.3 60.2 61.8 61.2 59.4 59.0 62.1 59.0 59.2 58.9 59.2 59.7 59.7 60.3 59.4 59.3 62.1 60.6 59.0 59.7 59.9 59.6 61.4 
SK 48.1 48.0 49.1 47.7 47.7 47.8 48.3 50.5 50.0 47.9 47.9 50.9 48.1 48.0 48.2 47.3 48.0 49.0 48.7 48.0 49.1 48.8 54.2 48.1 48.6 48.6 48.1 48.3 
FI 70.7 70.8 70.5 70.9 70.8 70.7 70.9 70.6 71.0 70.9 71.0 70.6 71.0 70.8 70.8 71.2 70.8 71.2 70.8 70.9 70.6 71.6 71.0 70.6 70.6 70.6 70.9 71.6 
SE 66.5 66.9 68.1 66.3 66.4 66.9 67.1 68.8 67.9 66.8 65.9 68.8 66.7 66.9 66.4 67.8 66.4 68.3 67.7 66.5 69.1 69.0 70.7 66.2 66.9 66.9 66.9 68.9 
UK 45.3 44.8 45.3 45.5 44.6 44.7 45.9 45.1 45.4 45.6 45.5 45.1 45.3 45.0 44.8 45.3 45.0 45.1 44.7 44.7 44.4 45.3 44.7 45.6 45.4 44.8 45.1 45.0 
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Table 13 Reweighted mean long-term PTRs in 2017 (in percent). Note: Rows show the work incentive of the country in the row header based on the reweighted population of the column header 
under a fixed tax-benefit system. Each column shows the work incentive of the country in the column header with fixed population characteristics but the tax-benefit system of the row 
header. The diagonal shows the original work incentive. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
BE 48.1 48.9 48.8 48.3 48.5 48.8 48.7 50.3 50.3 47.8 48.6 49.4 48.6 48.7 48.6 49.2 48.5 51.3 48.5 48.8 49.1 50.8 48.5 48.3 49.1 48.5 48.0 50.2 
BG 25.2 25.3 25.4 25.2 24.3 24.6 26.4 28.7 27.9 25.5 25.6 28.1 25.8 25.1 24.8 25.9 25.1 29.4 26.0 25.6 26.9 28.5 28.1 25.1 25.2 25.4 25.1 28.3 
CZ 35.1 34.7 34.8 34.8 33.9 34.5 36.3 37.5 37.6 35.0 35.4 38.2 36.2 35.2 34.9 36.3 34.5 38.4 36.1 35.8 37.7 38.2 38.3 34.6 35.0 35.2 34.8 38.0 
DK 57.3 58.0 57.3 56.8 56.7 56.7 57.4 60.6 59.1 57.7 59.7 58.6 60.0 57.9 57.5 58.7 57.7 60.4 57.8 57.7 58.9 59.3 61.4 57.9 58.2 57.3 56.5 59.4 
DE 43.8 44.3 44.5 44.3 43.5 44.0 44.3 45.7 45.1 43.8 44.5 46.2 43.9 44.3 43.7 44.6 44.2 45.7 44.3 44.0 45.5 45.5 46.7 44.2 43.9 44.2 43.8 45.2 
EE 35.0 36.6 37.0 35.2 35.0 34.5 36.8 37.1 38.8 35.6 38.5 39.7 37.2 35.8 35.4 35.4 36.2 40.8 36.0 36.6 36.5 39.3 37.2 36.5 37.1 36.2 35.0 38.5 
IE 44.3 45.5 45.9 43.6 44.3 44.4 44.2 46.6 45.1 44.4 46.2 46.7 44.4 44.5 44.1 44.0 45.4 46.5 44.2 43.6 44.6 45.0 48.4 45.1 45.7 44.5 43.3 44.4 
EL 39.7 40.6 41.1 39.0 38.8 39.5 40.4 45.8 42.6 39.7 41.6 44.0 40.9 40.6 40.2 39.9 40.5 42.3 40.6 40.9 42.4 42.5 44.2 40.0 41.1 40.1 38.5 41.6 
ES 30.8 32.5 35.3 30.8 32.2 31.5 31.3 36.2 32.1 31.0 32.9 34.1 31.3 32.2 32.6 30.6 32.7 31.8 31.9 32.9 34.7 31.6 36.0 32.2 35.2 31.6 30.9 31.4 
FR 39.7 40.4 40.9 39.7 40.0 40.0 39.4 40.1 40.2 39.9 40.5 40.6 40.1 40.3 39.7 40.7 40.4 41.0 40.1 40.4 40.9 41.0 40.2 40.4 40.6 39.8 39.7 41.1 
HR 31.4 29.8 29.8 31.2 30.6 31.5 31.7 31.2 31.5 30.8 28.7 29.9 30.7 30.9 31.1 31.3 29.8 32.0 31.4 30.9 32.0 30.2 30.6 29.8 29.6 31.1 31.2 31.1 
IT 25.5 24.1 25.5 25.3 24.9 26.2 25.4 24.8 23.7 24.8 22.8 24.1 23.7 24.9 25.6 23.7 24.6 22.1 25.7 24.5 25.6 21.9 24.8 24.8 24.9 25.8 26.3 22.8 
CY 30.4 33.4 33.5 29.9 30.8 30.8 30.2 35.3 34.3 30.2 33.3 36.1 30.7 32.1 31.1 32.5 32.8 32.3 31.0 32.1 34.0 35.8 35.2 31.8 32.9 30.6 28.7 33.4 
LV 30.9 30.9 30.9 30.4 31.1 30.2 32.5 33.6 32.7 30.6 31.5 32.7 31.5 30.2 30.4 31.6 30.4 34.4 31.2 31.0 31.4 34.3 31.7 30.5 30.8 30.8 30.4 34.1 
LT 25.0 25.2 24.7 25.2 24.0 24.4 25.6 27.5 27.5 24.6 25.7 27.4 25.6 25.0 24.8 26.6 24.9 26.9 25.0 24.5 26.0 28.5 26.0 25.3 24.7 24.9 24.0 27.7 
LU 44.9 46.0 45.4 45.4 44.5 45.3 47.2 50.0 48.9 44.5 46.2 48.1 46.3 45.2 45.0 43.6 45.4 48.2 45.4 45.0 46.9 47.6 46.3 45.3 45.5 45.9 44.9 47.0 
HU 40.9 42.7 42.8 39.6 40.7 40.8 40.8 47.1 44.8 40.4 41.8 46.1 42.5 41.9 41.7 41.3 41.5 42.7 41.9 42.0 46.4 43.4 44.2 41.0 42.8 41.7 39.5 42.3 
MT 31.4 33.1 32.8 30.7 32.3 31.8 31.2 34.8 33.3 31.3 35.2 33.5 32.1 32.3 32.1 31.3 32.9 34.9 31.5 33.5 32.7 33.4 33.3 32.2 33.2 31.8 30.3 33.0 
NL 33.2 35.5 34.7 34.0 34.1 34.5 32.2 32.8 35.1 33.4 36.1 34.9 33.8 34.7 33.9 35.3 34.8 35.2 32.7 33.7 33.5 37.3 32.3 34.3 35.3 33.2 32.1 35.3 
AT 48.5 48.5 47.9 47.4 46.5 47.6 49.7 52.4 52.2 48.2 49.8 51.2 50.4 48.3 47.6 50.0 47.8 53.6 48.6 47.8 50.5 53.7 50.3 48.3 48.5 48.4 47.1 53.0 
PL 35.0 34.7 34.3 35.2 34.1 34.3 35.8 34.7 35.1 35.4 34.9 34.7 34.8 34.1 34.1 35.0 34.4 36.2 34.9 34.8 33.9 35.3 34.4 34.6 34.0 34.8 35.0 35.5 
PT 41.5 41.7 42.5 41.5 41.3 40.8 43.0 44.4 43.1 41.5 42.7 43.6 42.1 41.2 41.5 41.2 41.8 42.9 41.6 41.9 42.5 42.3 43.3 41.8 42.1 41.9 41.2 41.8 
RO 29.3 29.6 28.7 29.6 29.6 29.4 29.6 29.1 30.0 29.4 29.6 29.5 29.7 29.6 29.4 29.5 29.3 31.4 29.1 29.1 28.4 30.2 29.1 29.4 28.7 29.3 29.1 29.9 
SI 40.8 40.3 40.0 40.0 39.4 40.1 43.1 44.8 43.4 40.2 40.4 42.5 41.8 40.0 39.7 40.6 39.6 42.3 41.2 40.4 41.0 42.9 41.9 39.6 40.4 40.9 39.9 42.5 
SK 36.4 36.7 38.2 35.3 35.6 36.2 37.0 41.4 39.9 35.9 37.1 41.4 36.8 37.0 37.0 35.3 36.7 38.5 37.5 37.0 39.0 37.7 44.9 36.7 37.8 37.6 35.7 36.7 
FI 55.9 56.6 56.9 55.8 55.8 55.8 56.3 58.6 57.6 56.1 57.6 57.6 57.1 56.5 56.1 57.3 56.6 58.3 56.3 56.8 57.8 58.8 58.1 56.3 57.2 56.0 55.6 58.4 
SE 31.1 30.9 31.3 30.7 30.5 31.0 31.5 33.4 33.5 30.8 30.7 33.1 31.1 31.1 30.8 32.4 30.6 34.5 31.6 30.6 32.5 34.3 34.0 30.7 30.4 31.0 30.7 33.5 
UK 36.6 36.7 37.7 36.5 35.8 36.2 37.0 38.9 37.4 36.7 37.5 37.6 36.9 36.8 36.7 36.0 36.9 36.7 36.2 36.6 37.3 36.3 37.6 37.4 37.9 36.5 36.1 35.7 
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Table 14 Reweighted mean MTRs in 2017 (in percent). Note: Rows show the work incentive of the country in the row header based on the reweighted population of the column header under a 
fixed tax-benefit system. Each column shows the work incentive of the country in the column header with fixed population characteristics but the tax-benefit system of the row header. The 
diagonal shows the original work incentive. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
BE 54.2 54.1 54.5 54.4 54.6 54.6 53.6 52.7 53.5 54.1 53.8 53.4 53.8 54.3 54.4 54.5 54.2 53.2 54.1 54.2 53.7 53.6 53.4 54.3 54.3 54.0 54.5 53.6 
BG 21.4 21.9 22.1 21.3 21.0 21.2 21.6 23.5 22.7 21.6 22.0 23.1 21.8 21.6 21.5 21.7 21.7 23.3 21.8 22.1 22.9 22.8 23.4 21.6 22.1 21.6 21.2 22.6 
CZ 29.4 29.3 28.5 29.6 29.4 29.6 29.7 28.8 30.3 29.4 28.8 29.7 29.5 29.4 29.1 30.4 29.1 31.7 29.5 28.5 29.1 30.6 29.4 29.1 28.5 29.2 29.5 30.7 
DK 46.1 45.4 45.5 46.0 46.0 45.9 46.5 45.7 45.7 45.8 44.9 45.7 45.5 45.5 45.7 45.4 45.3 45.0 46.0 45.4 45.2 44.9 45.4 45.5 45.4 46.1 46.0 45.2 
DE 45.6 46.3 45.4 46.1 45.3 45.7 46.2 49.0 48.7 45.6 45.9 48.5 46.2 46.0 45.5 46.7 45.7 49.5 46.3 45.7 47.5 49.5 50.1 45.8 45.3 45.9 45.4 49.1 
EE 23.2 23.1 23.5 23.1 23.1 23.1 23.8 23.7 23.2 23.3 24.2 24.0 23.7 23.3 23.4 23.0 23.3 22.7 23.5 23.2 23.1 23.2 23.5 23.6 23.6 23.7 23.1 23.4 
IE 40.0 37.4 37.3 39.9 38.8 39.2 41.2 37.9 39.2 38.9 36.8 37.4 38.6 38.4 39.4 38.2 37.7 36.5 39.2 39.5 39.7 37.4 36.7 38.5 37.2 39.7 40.0 37.6 
EL 33.7 31.9 33.0 33.3 33.5 33.3 34.7 32.6 31.0 32.7 31.4 31.4 32.2 32.5 33.6 30.5 32.3 28.3 33.1 32.2 32.4 28.0 30.9 32.7 32.7 33.9 33.7 28.8 
ES 26.1 24.9 25.0 26.2 26.6 26.4 25.9 22.5 23.5 25.2 24.0 23.0 24.7 25.4 26.1 24.4 25.1 22.2 25.4 25.1 24.5 21.9 22.8 25.4 25.0 26.1 26.6 22.5 
FR 39.7 40.3 40.8 39.6 39.9 39.7 40.1 42.3 41.5 39.5 40.4 42.1 40.0 40.1 39.7 40.6 40.0 42.1 40.3 40.6 41.3 42.3 42.4 39.9 40.6 40.3 39.2 42.0 
HR 30.7 29.7 28.2 30.5 31.5 31.0 30.0 25.1 28.6 29.8 28.1 25.8 29.4 29.6 30.5 29.1 29.6 28.4 29.2 28.9 26.2 27.4 24.9 29.7 28.8 29.9 30.8 27.7 
IT 42.4 40.9 42.4 42.7 41.9 43.7 42.4 38.8 39.3 42.1 39.7 40.2 40.6 41.8 42.3 41.8 41.4 38.8 42.3 40.9 41.5 38.9 40.9 41.8 41.3 42.3 43.7 39.9 
CY 24.0 24.4 22.6 24.1 22.9 23.7 24.1 25.0 25.9 23.6 23.4 25.4 23.4 23.7 23.4 24.5 23.9 25.2 23.9 22.9 23.2 26.3 24.5 23.6 22.1 24.4 23.3 25.6 
LV 31.2 31.5 30.8 31.2 31.0 31.1 31.0 31.7 31.9 31.2 31.6 31.4 31.6 31.1 31.1 32.3 31.2 32.5 31.1 31.1 31.0 33.1 31.0 31.2 30.9 31.0 31.0 32.7 
LT 26.4 26.7 26.4 26.4 26.7 26.4 26.3 25.9 26.2 26.3 26.9 25.6 26.4 26.5 26.6 26.3 26.8 26.7 26.1 26.8 26.1 27.1 25.6 26.5 26.5 26.2 26.4 26.7 
LU 46.3 47.3 47.1 45.8 46.3 45.7 47.4 49.9 47.7 45.9 47.5 47.6 46.9 46.2 46.7 43.7 46.6 49.2 46.1 46.5 46.8 45.7 46.9 46.4 46.9 46.8 46.4 45.8 
HU 30.1 29.4 19.9 30.5 31.1 27.7 37.6 37.7 36.3 30.3 29.0 34.9 31.6 32.2 30.1 31.8 29.1 36.4 32.1 23.3 16.6 42.3 42.0 28.6 19.5 32.6 33.1 40.8 
MT 25.4 25.9 25.6 25.9 24.9 25.4 24.8 25.3 25.5 25.5 26.2 24.7 25.3 25.5 25.6 25.2 25.8 25.8 25.3 25.7 25.8 25.3 25.9 26.2 26.0 25.6 25.7 25.2 
NL 42.5 42.3 41.6 44.9 43.5 45.1 42.6 41.3 42.1 42.0 42.4 41.4 42.2 42.0 42.3 41.4 41.8 40.7 41.3 42.7 42.3 41.1 40.3 42.4 41.8 42.4 42.3 40.4 
AT 42.5 42.5 42.8 42.3 42.2 42.5 42.6 44.8 43.8 42.2 42.2 43.1 42.7 42.6 42.7 41.6 42.4 41.8 42.4 42.3 43.4 42.4 43.1 42.4 42.9 42.8 42.1 42.3 
PL 31.3 31.5 30.2 31.4 31.3 31.0 31.4 29.5 31.4 31.4 31.8 29.8 31.5 30.9 30.9 31.2 31.3 32.4 30.7 31.2 29.5 31.7 29.4 31.2 30.5 31.1 31.2 31.6 
PT 36.4 35.2 34.7 36.5 37.2 36.6 36.3 32.4 33.5 35.3 33.9 32.5 35.0 35.5 36.8 33.6 35.2 31.8 35.4 35.3 32.8 31.0 32.1 35.4 34.9 36.3 36.9 31.5 
RO 31.6 31.8 31.4 31.9 31.7 31.5 31.8 32.3 32.3 31.7 31.9 32.0 31.8 31.7 31.7 31.8 31.7 33.5 31.6 31.6 31.7 32.4 33.0 31.7 31.4 31.7 31.7 32.2 
SI 39.9 40.0 39.2 40.0 40.3 39.9 40.4 38.4 40.1 39.7 40.0 39.2 40.0 39.9 39.9 40.5 39.8 40.6 39.4 39.8 38.6 40.6 37.2 39.7 39.2 39.7 39.9 40.7 
SK 32.2 32.3 33.0 31.7 31.4 31.8 33.1 34.5 34.6 32.1 32.5 34.6 32.7 32.0 32.0 31.7 32.2 34.2 33.1 32.4 33.1 33.7 43.7 32.3 32.8 32.8 32.1 33.4 
FI 45.8 45.2 44.9 45.8 45.5 45.6 46.0 45.9 45.6 45.4 45.1 44.9 45.6 45.4 45.8 44.8 45.5 45.3 45.6 45.7 45.3 44.3 45.4 45.4 45.4 45.6 45.8 44.7 
SE 38.7 37.7 38.2 38.6 38.3 38.3 39.3 40.3 39.6 38.0 36.9 39.5 37.7 37.9 38.3 37.9 37.8 38.1 38.9 37.9 38.9 38.5 40.2 38.1 37.5 38.9 38.7 38.0 
UK 39.8 39.0 39.6 39.9 38.9 39.1 40.7 40.4 39.7 39.9 39.9 39.4 39.7 39.3 39.3 39.1 39.3 39.0 39.2 39.2 39.0 38.8 39.3 40.0 39.7 39.7 39.8 38.9 
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Table 15 Characteristics of the population facing short-term PTRs above 75 percent in 2017. Note: “Low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or below, “medium-skilled” to upper and 
post secondary education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. “Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not have employment income.”Part-time” is 
defined as working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is the individual with the highest earnings in the household. High risk of unemployment (UE) refers to the 10% of the 
sample with the highest risk. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
Sample size 3180 1646 252 3147 5266 376 366 1744 1305 8444 167 1911 314 133 194 3353 546 219 4646 1110 780 5129 349 1285 248 2264 1174 1188 
% sample 61.0 31.9 3.9 49.7 48.5 5.9 7.6 17.0 12.2 81.3 3.3 11.9 7.2 2.1 4.8 84.0 8.9 5.1 39.4 20.1 6.0 63.7 4.9 11.8 4.3 20.3 20.5 7.1 
% male 46.4 48.4 48.8 43.6 57.9 49.0 39.4 49.8 49.8 51.1 43.8 33.5 59.0 40.7 56.0 51.9 52.9 59.3 68.6 42.5 52.6 45.7 63.2 57.1 59.9 48.4 44.3 48.5 
% female 53.6 51.6 51.2 56.4 42.1 51.0 60.6 50.2 50.2 48.9 56.2 66.5 41.0 59.3 44.0 48.1 47.1 40.7 31.4 57.5 47.4 54.3 36.8 42.9 40.1 51.6 55.7 51.5 
% age (<30) 20.7 1.2 16.0 9.8 9.2 24.3 15.2 20.1 16.7 18.3 12.0 10.5 14.4 14.5 27.3 17.4 20.7 57.5 7.6 26.3 10.4 10.8 33.6 6.0 21.2 22.7 33.5 19.0 
% age (30-50) 58.2 51.8 54.6 57.8 63.5 51.9 57.3 62.7 63.5 58.3 61.5 40.0 63.7 53.4 57.5 65.3 32.7 28.9 54.9 60.7 56.0 65.7 44.2 57.8 61.3 54.9 46.7 59.4 
% age (50+) 21.0 47.0 29.4 32.5 27.3 23.8 27.5 17.2 19.7 23.4 26.4 49.5 21.9 32.1 15.2 17.4 46.6 13.6 37.5 13.0 33.6 23.4 22.1 36.3 17.5 22.4 19.7 21.6 
% low-skilled 15.0 12.6 4.8 14.1 5.3 15.7 26.4 29.3 48.4 12.9 22.3 37.5 30.9 29.2 14.1 31.6 18.4 51.6 17.9 21.8 12.5 52.8 65.8 17.5 3.4 16.3 15.6 54.2 
% medium-skilled 43.0 65.7 79.7 52.6 53.0 60.1 36.7 49.0 23.9 47.5 70.1 47.1 54.2 59.4 67.7 40.2 63.3 31.7 40.2 58.5 69.9 26.7 28.4 64.2 82.8 49.5 51.7 26.9 
% high-skilled 42.1 21.7 15.4 33.3 41.8 24.2 37.0 21.7 27.7 39.6 7.5 15.4 14.9 11.4 18.2 28.2 18.2 16.7 41.9 19.7 17.6 20.5 5.8 18.2 13.8 34.2 32.7 18.9 
% employee 98.5 99.4 34.4 95.7 99.3 93.9 79.5 74.1 79.4 99.3 55.2 98.7 82.0 88.5 95.8 95.3 60.3 84.1 99.5 92.4 62.0 97.8 13.1 69.5 37.6 91.9 92.3 87.6 
% self-employed 1.5 0.6 65.6 4.3 0.7 6.1 20.5 25.9 20.6 0.7 44.8 1.0 18.0 11.5 4.2 4.7 39.7 15.9 0.5 7.6 38.0 2.2 86.9 30.5 62.4 8.1 7.7 12.4 
% main earner 59.6 63.4 49.3 55.3 70.1 63.6 68.3 57.3 61.8 67.0 59.9 43.5 78.1 86.3 60.8 64.5 51.5 40.2 85.1 54.9 44.8 61.4 50.3 50.2 59.7 66.5 51.5 71.0 
% secondary earner 40.4 36.6 50.7 44.7 29.9 36.4 31.7 42.7 38.2 33.0 40.1 56.5 21.9 13.7 39.2 35.5 48.5 59.8 14.9 45.1 55.2 38.6 49.7 49.8 40.3 33.5 48.5 29.0 
% part-timer 19.4 5.0 19.6 12.3 10.6 26.1 61.6 45.3 43.2 11.6 19.9 26.9 23.8 39.3 29.1 16.6 24.3 33.4 16.5 41.1 15.4 5.8 24.2 16.8 10.2 27.9 6.6 47.6 
% earnings Q1 17.6 8.9 81.6 19.4 6.3 86.7 56.5 67.5 54.8 10.5 67.1 25.2 5.6 89.4 90.8 15.1 45.3 91.1 14.2 40.2 67.1 16.0 93.1 42.9 77.4 39.8 48.4 54.2 
% earnings Q2 25.4 24.4 14.7 29.7 18.1 11.8 34.1 23.0 40.8 21.4 22.6 32.1 65.7 10.6 6.4 22.2 30.9 5.3 5.0 44.6 27.9 18.6 0.9 25.1 8.5 25.0 46.8 15.3 
% earnings Q3 29.1 25.8 2.4 31.8 18.5 1.5 7.8 8.6 4.3 23.3 7.7 25.2 24.8 0.0 2.8 22.8 8.4 3.6 12.1 10.5 4.4 22.4 1.5 27.3 4.6 14.5 2.4 16.9 
% earnings Q4 25.5 23.2 1.3 17.3 25.7 0.0 1.6 0.8 0.2 23.0 2.6 15.9 4.0 0.0 0.0 23.4 8.6 0.0 32.0 4.3 0.5 27.3 1.0 4.5 5.3 12.4 1.2 10.3 
% earnings Q5 2.4 17.6 0.0 1.7 31.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.8 0.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.5 6.8 0.0 36.8 0.4 0.0 15.7 3.5 0.2 4.2 8.3 1.2 3.4 
% poverty risk 3.4 9.2 53.0 4.9 3.3 73.8 19.9 33.5 62.0 2.4 36.4 9.4 56.4 97.0 65.7 9.1 43.0 27.5 7.8 32.6 36.2 9.5 83.2 28.5 53.7 14.8 23.1 21.0 
% high risk of UE 12.6 6.5 22.2 5.9 5.7 14.9 10.9 13.3 18.2 9.1 19.2 7.3 5.4 46.1 32.2 9.4 15.5 21.7 10.3 22.5 11.4 9.2 14.1 10.5 14.2 17.8 21.8 23.3 
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Table 15 Characteristics of the population facing long-term PTRs above 50 percent in 2017. Note: “Low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or below, “medium-skilled” to upper and 
post secondary education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. “Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not have employment income.”Part-time” is 
defined as working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is the individual with the highest earnings in the household. High risk of unemployment (UE) refers to the 10% of the 
sample with the highest risk. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
Sample size 2160 100 895 2698 3184 663 1492 3416 1417 2183 153 353 1058 424 234 1206 1133 953 1069 2065 1637 2732 542 1575 1075 7255 483 3677 
% sample 40.8 2.2 12.9 49.7 31.1 10.7 30.7 32.6 13.6 23.3 3.1 1.8 21.9 6.8 6.7 33.4 18.8 21.3 15.9 36.2 13.3 32.7 7.6 19.5 18.0 62.6 10.2 21.5 
% male 58.6 57.1 52.4 57.4 57.5 49.8 59.5 65.4 57.2 57.4 50.5 61.7 54.0 43.1 65.5 61.5 56.1 65.5 58.5 61.1 53.8 53.3 67.0 62.0 63.6 50.9 62.9 60.8 
% female 41.4 42.9 47.6 42.6 42.5 50.2 40.5 34.6 42.8 42.6 49.5 38.3 46.0 56.9 34.5 38.5 43.9 34.5 41.5 38.9 46.2 46.7 33.0 38.0 36.4 49.1 37.1 39.2 
% age (<30) 21.9 19.8 15.5 19.7 22.7 27.2 17.0 12.4 10.3 20.8 13.2 10.4 21.1 15.9 34.2 12.6 33.6 50.3 37.2 26.4 14.6 13.2 30.7 14.0 12.3 17.5 20.7 19.8 
% age (30-50) 52.9 58.1 62.2 58.4 51.5 51.0 54.5 62.8 65.8 62.4 68.2 40.6 57.6 55.2 55.6 67.9 43.5 33.4 39.9 55.0 71.2 63.8 50.6 67.0 65.8 56.9 50.7 60.9 
% age (50+) 25.2 22.1 22.3 21.9 25.8 21.7 28.5 24.8 23.9 16.7 18.6 49.0 21.2 28.8 10.1 19.5 23.0 16.3 22.8 18.6 14.2 23.0 18.8 19.0 21.9 25.6 28.6 19.4 
% low-skilled 12.9 64.6 5.1 16.6 9.5 18.1 19.0 30.1 48.5 16.5 17.0 28.0 28.8 16.6 20.6 38.4 13.8 57.5 29.1 14.6 9.5 66.1 60.5 11.9 3.1 11.9 16.9 48.9 
% medium-skilled 34.1 31.1 79.5 47.8 60.1 58.1 33.0 43.8 23.6 56.0 73.7 35.8 49.1 66.6 63.5 34.4 63.6 30.4 46.3 55.0 71.2 23.0 34.7 64.5 76.9 45.5 47.4 26.5 
% high-skilled 52.9 4.4 15.4 35.7 30.4 23.8 48.0 26.1 27.9 27.4 9.3 36.2 22.1 16.8 15.9 27.2 22.7 12.0 24.6 30.5 19.4 10.9 4.8 23.6 20.0 42.6 35.6 24.7 
% employee 88.7 74.0 60.7 95.9 94.9 94.0 84.5 41.8 63.0 91.4 67.3 25.1 86.3 91.7 92.6 93.8 64.7 87.1 98.5 90.6 81.2 92.5 23.7 81.6 38.8 93.0 86.8 86.0 
% self-employed 11.3 26.0 39.3 4.1 5.1 6.0 15.5 58.2 37.0 8.6 32.7 72.5 13.7 8.3 7.4 6.2 35.3 12.9 1.5 9.4 18.8 7.5 76.3 18.4 61.2 7.0 13.2 14.0 
% main earner 76.8 87.3 72.2 75.8 75.2 71.8 73.6 77.9 75.1 75.7 76.9 63.2 76.9 95.5 77.9 91.0 51.7 50.3 80.4 82.6 56.1 86.9 58.7 80.6 69.1 71.8 93.2 88.6 
% secondary earner 23.2 12.7 27.8 24.2 24.8 28.2 26.4 22.1 24.9 24.3 23.1 36.8 23.1 4.5 22.1 9.0 48.3 49.7 19.6 17.4 43.9 13.1 41.3 19.4 30.9 28.2 6.8 11.4 
% part-timer 11.3 43.6 9.7 10.5 13.4 19.2 32.1 22.9 35.3 13.0 17.0 10.7 21.1 19.7 17.6 13.2 13.4 11.0 35.2 17.1 9.3 7.5 18.6 11.9 6.2 14.0 12.5 20.7 
% earnings Q1 17.5 83.4 43.4 22.1 20.2 58.5 24.6 36.4 39.7 15.5 46.7 23.6 26.6 43.4 64.3 17.3 30.6 38.1 30.6 23.7 29.4 22.4 80.2 29.1 36.7 17.9 25.4 22.8 
% earnings Q2 18.2 10.1 21.5 21.7 26.6 26.2 24.8 19.3 41.1 28.9 32.0 14.5 33.7 36.3 25.1 24.0 32.2 42.8 28.8 21.7 34.8 29.0 9.3 27.1 14.9 22.1 26.4 21.0 
% earnings Q3 17.9 4.9 18.2 20.8 22.3 11.2 14.8 13.8 16.0 26.2 13.3 9.9 25.3 14.9 7.9 23.4 16.1 16.6 22.5 19.4 24.7 25.4 4.7 19.4 12.7 19.6 20.5 22.5 
% earnings Q4 17.3 1.3 12.2 16.9 18.4 3.6 13.4 14.2 3.0 19.8 7.9 11.8 10.7 5.2 2.0 16.6 9.7 2.1 13.7 18.5 9.0 15.5 3.2 12.7 13.4 18.6 12.8 19.1 
% earnings Q5 29.2 0.4 4.6 18.5 12.5 0.5 22.5 16.2 0.1 9.6 0.2 40.2 3.7 0.3 0.6 18.8 11.4 0.4 4.4 16.7 2.0 7.8 2.6 11.7 22.3 21.8 15.0 14.6 
% poverty risk 5.7 81.0 25.4 5.7 11.7 61.9 7.7 24.9 62.8 5.4 50.7 8.6 33.8 73.0 67.2 21.1 30.6 14.0 16.0 19.4 19.3 24.8 74.2 32.1 23.0 5.8 24.3 10.9 
% high risk of UE 17.9 54.9 23.0 14.3 16.8 16.1 15.6 12.2 17.7 13.0 27.4 3.1 8.4 31.8 39.9 15.5 17.7 14.2 30.6 15.1 10.1 18.7 16.1 20.3 10.6 11.9 16.2 15.0 
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Table 17 Characteristics of the population facing short-term METRs above 50 percent in 2017. Note: “Low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or below, “medium-skilled” to upper 
and post secondary education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. “Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not have employment income.”Part-
time” is defined as working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is the individual with the highest earnings in the household. Results for Bulgaria omitted due to small sample size. 
High risk of unemployment (UE) refers to the 10% of the sample with the highest risk. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
Sample size 4318 26 185 1995 2200 100 1508 912 54 1743 49 3410 476 86 69 955 372 106 2553 601 465 496 411 1077 509 4143 2150 3085 
% sample 81.4 - 2.7 28.8 21.1 1.7 32.3 8.6 0.5 17.6 0.9 21.0 9.1 1.3 2.1 25.1 7.0 2.5 24.0 11.0 3.5 6.3 5.4 11.7 9.8 31.4 34.0 16.9 
% male 55.3 - 38.4 64.4 40.6 52.2 59.3 78.8 49.2 53.4 64.3 68.8 39.7 41.6 65.5 44.2 62.9 63.0 71.6 53.6 55.4 51.4 67.4 58.9 75.0 63.8 65.4 54.0 
% female 44.7 - 61.6 35.6 59.4 47.8 40.7 21.2 50.8 46.6 35.7 31.2 60.3 58.4 34.5 55.8 37.1 37.0 28.4 46.4 44.6 48.6 32.6 41.1 25.0 36.2 34.6 46.0 
% age (<30) 15.5 - 15.2 9.0 13.7 27.6 5.4 2.3 0.9 27.2 21.8 5.2 23.5 14.6 40.0 17.3 9.7 47.3 16.5 20.1 18.2 9.0 35.4 13.5 11.4 11.6 5.6 15.4 
% age (30-50) 60.8 - 68.1 59.4 54.6 52.9 67.1 63.0 76.5 53.1 42.0 68.4 58.6 57.5 50.7 61.9 62.0 34.4 58.5 52.7 65.2 66.5 40.5 68.8 67.8 57.3 60.0 66.6 
% age (50+) 23.6 - 16.6 31.6 31.7 19.5 27.5 34.7 22.5 19.7 36.2 26.4 17.9 27.9 9.3 20.8 28.4 18.3 25.0 27.2 16.5 24.5 24.0 17.7 20.8 31.1 34.4 17.9 
% low-skilled 10.5 - 10.7 10.5 9.1 14.9 13.6 13.6 32.1 17.9 14.9 26.0 34.1 34.8 24.9 24.4 5.8 58.6 16.7 14.3 14.8 34.3 72.8 13.5 1.6 8.1 7.7 51.5 
% medium-skilled 36.2 - 78.1 36.1 54.4 62.4 16.9 31.1 15.9 55.0 42.8 44.9 46.1 55.5 65.3 36.3 59.6 30.9 37.5 47.9 70.4 18.2 26.4 62.3 75.8 30.0 39.8 25.6 
% high-skilled 53.2 - 11.2 53.4 36.6 22.7 69.5 55.3 52.0 27.0 42.3 29.1 19.7 9.7 9.8 39.3 34.6 10.5 45.8 37.8 14.8 47.5 0.9 24.2 22.6 61.9 52.5 22.9 
% employee 92.7 - 89.9 95.5 94.7 94.3 90.9 44.8 96.6 90.5 97.0 80.5 89.1 85.0 100.0 93.2 40.7 87.2 95.7 73.6 93.2 94.1 3.9 86.2 11.9 94.5 94.3 84.3 
% self-employed 7.3 - 10.1 4.5 5.3 5.7 9.1 55.2 3.4 9.5 3.0 19.2 10.9 15.0 0.0 6.8 59.3 12.8 4.3 26.4 6.8 5.9 96.1 13.8 88.1 5.5 5.7 15.7 
% main earner 67.0 - 76.1 87.7 60.9 88.9 77.3 94.7 79.2 71.6 93.8 84.8 64.2 82.1 84.5 65.6 67.9 51.4 89.0 71.1 66.8 71.8 48.3 74.4 78.2 82.2 84.1 84.2 
% secondary earner 33.0 - 23.9 12.3 39.1 11.1 22.7 5.3 20.8 28.4 6.2 15.2 35.8 17.9 15.5 34.4 32.1 48.6 11.0 28.9 33.2 28.2 51.7 25.6 21.8 17.8 15.9 15.8 
% part-timer 10.9 - 9.8 5.2 27.2 26.2 18.4 4.2 15.3 21.7 7.0 4.4 34.6 42.5 32.7 20.7 3.1 26.0 17.6 26.8 20.8 8.5 24.4 11.4 4.9 10.2 3.4 29.1 
% earnings Q1 7.2 - 44.5 8.2 30.0 93.4 8.7 5.3 6.7 29.7 29.4 1.5 65.5 97.2 89.5 18.0 5.0 72.3 11.9 30.2 44.6 25.1 96.4 24.1 18.2 12.1 7.4 33.2 
% earnings Q2 21.7 - 38.2 9.9 15.9 6.6 9.8 2.1 23.3 34.9 8.7 3.7 25.0 2.2 2.9 14.4 15.9 22.3 13.1 31.5 27.7 14.4 2.6 39.5 13.4 4.8 2.9 29.4 
% earnings Q3 22.9 - 11.5 9.7 9.2 0.0 10.8 6.4 40.8 15.5 8.5 11.2 3.9 0.0 7.6 11.9 26.7 5.4 23.1 7.2 13.6 2.5 1.0 15.3 14.3 2.7 2.4 16.0 
% earnings Q4 23.6 - 4.8 7.5 28.5 0.0 20.0 4.8 15.3 8.1 4.0 40.6 2.9 0.0 0.0 39.6 19.8 0.0 12.7 14.4 7.6 7.1 0.0 7.9 18.8 16.6 26.4 6.1 
% earnings Q5 24.7 - 1.0 64.6 16.3 0.0 50.7 81.4 13.9 11.8 49.4 43.1 2.7 0.6 0.0 16.1 32.7 0.0 39.3 16.7 6.5 50.9 0.0 13.1 35.4 63.8 60.9 15.3 
% poverty risk 1.2 - 30.7 1.2 14.7 100.0 1.7 7.5 27.5 9.4 34.1 2.5 41.7 97.8 87.8 18.2 10.4 24.6 9.8 31.5 27.3 28.1 88.0 31.7 21.3 5.8 6.9 12.1 
% high risk of UE 9.1 - 42.5 7.2 14.1 19.9 7.9 4.4 6.0 20.0 28.9 5.3 10.4 49.2 59.5 11.9 7.8 24.2 10.3 14.2 19.5 14.9 14.1 15.8 9.7 8.4 4.3 17.4 
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Table 18  Characteristics of the population facing short-term PTRs above 120 percent of the median in each country in 2017. Note: “Low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or 
below, “medium-skilled” to upper and post secondary education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. “Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not 
have employment income.”Part-time” is defined as working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is the individual with the highest earnings in the household. Results for 
Luxembourg omitted due to small sample size. High risk of unemployment (UE) refers to the 10% of the sample with the highest risk. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version 
H1.0 
 
BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
Sample size 246 1155 1644 896 334 563 1124 2571 3375 281 432 1229 1176 159 1128 21 1254 1836 393 909 3392 603 958 2370 602 577 560 5465 
% sample 4.5 21.7 20.9 15.5 3.6 8.8 23.1 25.0 30.3 2.8 8.4 7.7 24.5 2.5 24.6 - 19.9 41.0 5.9 16.5 27.1 7.8 13.4 21.4 10.4 4.9 9.9 31.1 
% male 27.9 47.8 53.6 36.8 65.0 48.6 49.4 52.4 52.6 48.0 43.5 30.7 54.7 42.7 52.6 - 57.2 64.8 65.7 38.9 53.5 26.4 54.7 53.7 63.1 48.9 48.8 53.6 
% female 72.1 52.2 46.4 63.2 35.0 51.4 50.6 47.6 47.4 52.0 56.5 69.3 45.3 57.3 47.4 - 42.8 35.2 34.3 61.1 46.5 73.6 45.3 46.3 36.9 51.1 51.2 46.4 
% age (<30) 27.4 1.5 7.6 15.2 35.7 21.2 12.6 19.1 18.3 26.6 6.8 10.4 19.6 15.9 16.4 - 19.5 43.5 31.0 26.4 12.6 13.1 18.0 4.4 17.0 21.4 30.7 17.1 
% age (30-50) 50.4 37.7 38.3 54.3 54.8 54.3 53.9 62.8 61.5 51.5 73.3 41.1 59.1 53.4 38.0 - 32.6 38.1 46.7 61.8 53.7 63.8 58.6 56.4 62.2 50.2 47.7 63.2 
% age (50+) 22.2 60.8 54.1 30.5 9.5 24.5 33.5 18.2 20.2 21.9 19.9 48.5 21.3 30.7 45.5 - 47.9 18.4 22.3 11.8 33.8 23.2 23.4 39.3 20.9 28.4 21.6 19.7 
% low-skilled 28.4 12.7 3.7 18.5 21.7 17.2 20.7 28.6 45.4 25.6 21.8 39.0 27.4 26.1 7.3 - 15.1 50.0 26.2 22.3 9.6 55.7 45.9 18.0 3.1 15.1 17.5 49.6 
% medium-skilled 45.7 68.2 80.4 53.1 50.6 57.7 31.8 48.6 25.0 55.9 70.9 47.3 48.9 62.1 70.5 - 62.5 28.8 53.0 58.2 72.3 21.5 50.7 66.2 78.3 54.0 51.9 26.1 
% high-skilled 25.9 19.2 15.9 28.4 27.7 25.1 47.6 22.7 29.6 18.4 7.3 13.7 23.7 11.8 22.2 - 22.4 21.2 20.9 19.5 18.1 22.8 3.4 15.8 18.6 30.9 30.6 24.3 
% employee 92.2 99.3 62.2 89.4 99.3 95.1 84.4 72.6 84.7 89.8 72.3 98.1 86.5 88.4 98.0 - 67.2 90.2 98.2 92.9 81.4 94.4 60.8 79.2 38.6 77.4 86.7 89.9 
% self-employed 7.8 0.7 37.8 10.6 0.7 4.9 15.6 27.4 15.3 10.2 27.7 1.6 13.5 11.6 2.0 - 32.8 9.8 1.8 7.1 18.6 5.6 39.2 20.8 61.4 22.6 13.3 10.1 
% main earner 57.0 62.8 61.0 44.3 54.4 61.3 71.5 61.9 66.3 42.9 57.8 41.0 76.4 88.5 55.9 - 57.4 54.2 78.3 49.6 57.0 31.1 54.0 54.4 66.4 70.1 57.9 78.3 
% secondary earner 43.0 37.2 39.0 55.7 45.6 38.7 28.5 38.1 33.7 57.1 42.2 59.0 23.6 11.5 44.1 - 42.6 45.8 21.7 50.4 43.0 68.9 46.0 45.6 33.6 29.9 42.1 21.7 
% part-timer 67.6 6.1 6.7 24.9 15.1 24.2 41.2 36.3 30.3 37.7 12.5 29.7 20.2 36.3 9.8 - 15.7 9.7 47.8 46.5 10.6 25.3 11.4 13.5 8.9 29.6 10.1 27.6 
% earnings Q1 95.7 10.6 31.1 48.6 42.7 78.8 31.0 52.8 24.3 79.5 43.9 34.0 24.8 81.3 32.4 - 33.9 25.6 60.8 47.0 31.9 61.8 45.4 28.9 50.1 53.6 62.4 30.1 
% earnings Q2 4.3 23.9 24.8 48.3 12.2 16.9 25.9 31.7 36.9 12.6 32.8 35.8 30.7 16.7 32.1 - 19.6 25.2 18.1 44.4 28.4 4.3 42.4 27.0 13.9 29.5 33.9 19.8 
% earnings Q3 0.0 27.4 16.8 1.3 12.7 3.4 14.8 9.9 27.2 5.4 20.1 19.7 24.6 1.9 22.8 - 17.5 22.8 8.8 7.0 24.1 5.8 7.9 29.3 10.2 8.6 1.0 19.2 
% earnings Q4 0.0 22.2 18.1 1.3 17.1 0.9 12.7 5.2 11.3 1.2 3.3 9.7 12.5 0.0 11.9 - 15.9 16.1 3.7 1.4 13.9 22.6 3.0 13.9 10.9 5.4 0.8 16.8 
% earnings Q5 0.0 15.9 9.2 0.4 15.2 0.0 15.6 0.4 0.2 1.4 0.0 0.8 7.4 0.0 0.8 - 13.1 10.2 8.6 0.1 1.8 5.6 1.3 0.9 15.0 2.9 1.8 14.0 
% poverty risk 30.1 10.3 16.2 14.1 10.8 62.3 8.2 27.5 34.1 15.4 23.0 12.7 30.6 95.3 24.8 - 26.7 7.8 36.4 36.8 17.5 15.8 40.0 21.5 37.1 18.0 39.3 8.5 
% high risk of UE 28.7 6.8 12.3 9.2 13.5 12.6 11.1 13.6 17.2 17.9 9.6 7.6 7.8 44.7 13.3 - 13.0 11.4 26.6 22.5 10.3 10.5 8.3 9.7 13.8 13.1 23.0 14.4 
threshold 93.3 80.4 57.8 89.9 89.8 66.6 54.0 66.8 52.8 95.6 67.2 77.8 47.1 69.7 49.9 105.3 56.5 36.5 85.7 82.3 51.0 95.0 59.2 69.8 59.1 85.0 77.5 48.9 
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Table 19  Characteristics of the population facing long-term PTRs above 120 percent of the median in each country in 2017. Note: “Low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or 
below, “medium-skilled” to upper and post secondary education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. “Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not 
have employment income.”Part-time” is defined as working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is the individual with the highest earnings in the household. High risk of 
unemployment (UE) refers to the 10% of the sample with the highest risk. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
Sample size 1040  1390  2136  1806  2960  1691  1240  3165  3577  2840  1395  6299  2133  981  1054  1181  1789  1898  3474  1692  3404  3405  1699  2358  2775  2299  1817 6386  
% sample 19.8 30.1 30.3 37.3 29.0 27.5 25.6 30.2 33.4 30.0 26.6 36.3 45.0 15.9 27.6 32.6 28.6 42.4 33.8 29.9 28.3 41.2 24.1 28.7 43.4 22.2 31.7 36.7 
% male 56.2 55.2 57.6 53.5 56.8 48.0 59.7 64.7 59.6 58.2 54.7 61.6 58.8 50.4 53.4 61.1 56.3 67.2 68.4 59.9 58.4 55.7 64.4 61.3 61.8 49.8 65.4 60.3 
% female 43.8 44.8 42.4 46.5 43.2 52.0 40.3 35.3 40.4 41.8 45.3 38.4 41.2 49.6 46.6 38.9 43.7 32.8 31.6 40.1 41.6 44.3 35.6 38.7 38.2 50.2 34.6 39.7 
% age (<30) 20.0 10.9 12.7 22.1 22.4 24.5 17.8 12.0 7.4 19.9 16.3 6.5 17.0 13.8 29.5 12.8 31.3 42.4 22.4 29.0 12.8 11.1 27.1 14.3 24.4 29.5 11.6 18.0 
% age (30-50) 55.7 65.9 65.0 58.6 51.9 51.1 52.5 62.6 66.0 61.9 56.5 59.8 58.8 57.5 47.9 67.7 47.8 38.0 43.5 54.0 72.8 65.0 53.5 66.6 57.6 46.4 58.7 60.9 
% age (50+) 24.3 23.3 22.3 19.2 25.7 24.3 29.7 25.4 26.6 18.1 27.3 33.7 24.3 28.8 22.6 19.5 20.9 19.7 34.1 17.0 14.4 23.9 19.4 19.1 17.9 24.1 29.7 21.1 
% low-skilled 17.9 21.4 3.6 17.1 10.0 15.7 21.0 31.2 36.9 15.3 6.1 19.9 22.0 12.9 7.8 38.8 10.5 47.1 20.0 16.1 7.2 58.8 39.1 10.7 2.4 17.5 10.9 47.2 
% medium-skilled 39.0 56.1 77.4 49.0 60.6 56.6 33.7 44.2 23.6 55.4 51.3 44.0 41.9 59.9 57.7 34.3 61.4 29.0 39.5 56.1 64.7 23.0 50.0 58.4 71.9 53.2 44.2 25.7 
% high-skilled 43.1 22.4 19.0 33.9 29.4 27.7 45.4 24.6 39.6 29.3 42.6 36.2 36.2 27.2 34.5 26.9 28.2 24.0 40.5 27.8 28.1 18.2 10.8 30.9 25.6 29.3 44.9 27.2 
% employee 85.6 72.8 65.7 96.5 94.8 96.6 84.0 39.9 75.3 92.1 82.1 63.0 88.0 94.2 84.8 93.8 75.9 89.7 96.9 90.1 82.4 92.9 68.3 84.4 70.9 88.1 93.8 87.5 
% self-employed 14.4 27.2 34.3 3.5 5.2 3.4 16.0 60.1 24.7 7.9 17.9 35.5 12.0 5.8 15.2 6.2 24.1 10.3 3.1 9.9 17.6 7.1 31.7 15.6 29.1 11.9 6.2 12.5 
% main earner 89.8 73.0 72.4 74.9 75.9 67.0 72.5 77.6 79.5 76.6 60.4 69.0 82.2 95.8 78.1 90.8 57.6 57.8 84.2 83.0 67.7 87.6 73.1 79.1 67.6 77.7 89.8 85.4 
% secondary earner 10.2 27.0 27.6 25.1 24.1 33.0 27.5 22.4 20.5 23.4 39.6 31.0 17.8 4.2 21.9 9.2 42.4 42.2 15.8 17.0 32.3 12.4 26.9 20.9 32.4 22.3 10.2 14.6 
% part-timer 16.3 7.8 7.1 11.8 14.0 13.5 34.8 23.3 19.7 11.6 4.5 5.7 13.4 11.2 8.5 13.4 9.2 7.4 23.1 17.9 6.6 6.1 6.7 9.4 3.0 26.7 6.0 18.3 
% earnings Q1 29.5 18.2 27.8 24.7 21.3 37.1 28.4 38.5 18.8 12.8 12.8 6.1 15.3 21.1 22.1 17.6 20.7 21.9 18.2 27.6 16.5 17.9 32.2 22.8 19.8 42.1 13.8 19.4 
% earnings Q2 20.1 25.7 20.6 24.8 28.2 34.6 27.1 18.0 22.6 26.7 12.3 11.4 20.6 26.3 20.4 24.4 23.7 24.0 17.6 21.7 20.5 23.1 24.1 23.2 16.8 26.2 14.7 17.7 
% earnings Q3 17.5 21.6 18.1 24.0 21.3 15.2 13.4 14.1 20.5 27.9 8.8 11.1 20.4 19.7 18.8 23.6 20.2 22.3 14.0 21.2 22.7 20.4 20.4 18.6 22.5 13.5 12.8 19.9 
% earnings Q4 17.5 16.3 16.7 18.2 17.7 9.7 12.4 14.4 17.5 21.1 21.9 21.0 20.4 18.3 17.9 16.6 20.2 16.0 13.4 18.5 23.1 18.7 17.7 15.1 21.1 10.3 12.3 19.3 
% earnings Q5 15.4 18.2 16.8 8.3 11.5 3.3 18.6 14.9 20.7 11.5 44.2 50.4 23.4 14.6 20.8 17.7 15.2 15.7 36.8 11.0 17.2 19.9 5.6 20.4 19.8 7.9 46.4 23.7 
% poverty risk 11.4 22.3 13.9 7.4 12.5 30.6 9.3 26.4 29.7 4.7 8.0 3.2 18.1 38.3 22.1 21.5 21.2 7.3 8.0 23.2 12.0 19.7 30.9 23.5 10.3 15.7 12.5 7.3 
% high risk of UE 29.9 17.3 16.4 15.9 17.6 14.7 16.6 12.0 13.8 11.3 7.2 5.1 7.2 23.3 21.2 15.7 14.4 9.6 17.4 17.3 8.5 16.6 18.4 17.0 10.9 23.4 8.7 12.0 
threshold 57.1 26.4 37.3 59.8 50.8 36.8 52.6 51.3 34.3 46.4 32.3 30.0 24.8 34.3 26.9 50.6 41.4 30.5 34.9 54.0 35.7 44.0 34.8 43.6 37.0 61.9 31.2 39.4 
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Table 20 Characteristics of the population facing METRs above 120 percent of the median in each country in 2017. Note: “Low-skilled” refers to lower secondary education or below, 
“medium-skilled” to upper and post secondary education and “high-skilled” to tertiary education. “Self-employed” are defined as those with self-employment income, who do not have 
employment income.”Part-time” is defined as working less than 30 hours per week. “Main earner” is the individual with the highest earnings in the household. High risk of unemployment 
(UE) refers to the 10% of the sample with the highest risk. Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR HR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK 
Sample size 603 471 495 1983 1169 160 401 2156 3247 2138 2536 2408 2174 88 70 420 397 1110 667 518 1136 1371 591 1680 1392 1392 2,362 5232 
% sample 11.5 9.5 8.1 28.5 11.1 2.5 8.6 20.4 25.1 22.1 47.0 14.7 43.3 1.4 2.2 11.5 7.6 25.7 9.6 9.5 9.8 17.7 8.6 17.3 22.8 9.5 37.8 29.6 
% male 49.3 65.7 64.0 64.3 36.3 57.2 48.4 72.8 58.6 55.0 55.8 67.5 56.9 42.0 66.4 48.4 62.6 60.3 63.1 52.2 47.7 50.0 70.1 60.3 47.8 65.4 63.3 60.2 
% female 50.7 34.3 36.0 35.7 63.7 42.8 51.6 27.2 41.4 45.0 44.2 32.5 43.1 58.0 33.6 51.6 37.4 39.7 36.9 47.8 52.3 50.0 29.9 39.7 52.2 34.6 36.7 39.8 
% age (<30) 32.0 10.7 8.3 9.0 18.4 19.6 6.8 2.7 7.1 26.4 15.3 6.4 9.5 14.2 38.9 13.8 9.7 33.6 36.7 20.8 20.3 7.2 24.3 9.7 16.2 26.1 6.3 11.6 
% age (30-50) 53.4 57.5 62.2 59.3 51.3 54.2 66.5 63.9 61.6 52.5 56.4 67.0 65.3 57.6 52.0 64.9 62.8 49.8 45.8 54.0 60.2 66.7 54.8 66.7 62.6 45.9 60.0 64.8 
% age (50+) 14.6 31.8 29.5 31.7 30.3 26.3 26.7 33.5 31.3 21.1 28.3 26.6 25.2 28.2 9.1 21.3 27.5 16.6 17.5 25.2 19.5 26.1 20.9 23.6 21.2 28.0 33.7 23.6 
% low-skilled 20.3 21.8 4.9 10.4 15.7 14.2 22.3 13.2 17.0 16.1 4.8 27.3 14.3 35.4 24.3 40.9 5.5 38.8 26.6 15.9 11.0 22.5 54.9 9.6 3.0 12.1 8.2 42.9 
% medium-skilled 50.1 48.0 75.0 36.1 57.3 59.1 22.5 36.6 21.2 53.4 58.6 44.6 34.6 54.1 66.2 36.6 60.0 33.2 49.2 48.1 60.8 23.7 41.8 49.5 77.0 36.2 40.5 23.3 
% high-skilled 29.6 30.2 20.1 53.4 27.0 26.8 55.2 50.2 61.9 30.5 36.5 28.1 51.1 10.4 9.5 22.5 34.5 28.0 24.2 36.0 28.3 53.9 3.3 40.9 20.0 51.7 51.3 33.8 
% employee 94.9 17.0 34.2 95.5 91.4 80.1 93.6 42.4 95.9 89.1 93.4 75.8 91.9 83.9 100.0 86.5 44.8 91.4 95.4 72.5 97.0 97.9 38.7 87.1 57.5 90.0 94.9 85.1 
% self-employed 5.1 83.0 65.8 4.5 8.6 19.9 6.4 57.6 4.1 10.9 6.6 24.0 8.1 16.1 0.0 13.5 55.2 8.6 4.6 27.5 3.0 2.1 61.3 12.9 42.5 10.0 5.1 14.9 
% main earner 54.7 64.9 79.5 87.8 60.3 85.5 80.3 90.6 74.6 72.2 62.6 82.0 76.8 82.5 82.3 68.7 68.6 58.6 80.8 68.4 53.2 68.1 62.5 77.3 50.4 81.7 83.5 85.4 
% secondary earner 45.3 35.1 20.5 12.2 39.7 14.5 19.7 9.4 25.4 27.8 37.4 18.0 23.2 17.5 17.7 31.3 31.4 41.4 19.2 31.6 46.8 31.9 37.5 22.7 49.6 18.3 16.5 14.6 
% part-timer 10.9 12.5 6.1 5.3 38.2 20.5 35.6 3.9 7.9 19.4 0.7 5.1 9.4 41.5 31.8 28.2 3.5 5.0 31.4 30.1 18.1 3.9 15.8 7.8 4.2 25.9 4.3 19.1 
% earnings Q1 23.8 29.2 18.3 8.3 50.2 68.3 17.3 2.2 2.3 26.6 0.6 1.8 14.0 94.8 89.8 37.1 5.0 8.2 26.3 33.9 45.0 9.6 61.4 16.3 39.3 37.3 9.3 20.9 
% earnings Q2 71.1 15.2 18.9 9.8 24.0 8.4 27.4 1.1 6.0 30.1 4.8 4.6 6.5 2.1 2.8 29.6 16.0 8.1 26.3 35.4 24.0 6.9 4.1 26.7 22.9 9.2 5.2 17.5 
% earnings Q3 3.5 15.8 6.1 9.5 10.1 10.8 16.4 4.7 18.6 16.4 24.6 8.4 2.1 0.0 7.4 12.6 25.7 53.3 40.4 6.9 7.3 3.9 14.7 11.4 9.4 2.2 3.5 10.1 
% earnings Q4 1.2 16.0 20.8 7.5 10.5 2.3 15.0 20.7 11.8 10.7 28.5 48.7 28.5 0.0 0.0 14.7 18.7 17.3 5.9 10.9 6.4 12.7 16.5 7.1 9.7 2.9 27.2 4.7 
% earnings Q5 0.4 23.9 35.8 64.9 5.2 10.1 23.8 71.2 61.4 16.1 41.6 36.6 49.0 3.1 0.0 6.0 34.6 13.2 1.1 12.9 17.3 66.9 3.2 38.5 18.6 48.4 54.8 46.7 
% poverty risk 5.8 23.4 14.8 1.3 27.5 76.1 4.8 4.1 1.0 8.5 0.7 2.4 9.6 95.4 85.5 39.5 10.7 3.4 20.3 36.2 22.0 10.0 63.5 21.8 11.4 17.9 8.7 7.3 
% high risk of UE 21.3 12.6 18.9 7.1 20.0 13.9 13.4 5.3 5.2 19.3 6.0 6.5 4.0 48.0 57.9 20.0 8.1 7.3 22.2 15.2 17.3 7.7 14.4 10.7 13.0 21.8 4.5 11.0 
threshold 66.3 26.4 37.3 51.4 53.4 27.5 60.0 43.3 34.6 44.5 24.0 52.1 15.8 37.3 37.8 52.2 41.4 30.0 59.0 51.9 36.4 43.0 35.8 46.3 35.8 56.2 38.8 41.3 
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Table 21 Probit results for facing low work incentives using an absolute threshold in 2017. Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. Including country-fixed 
effects. dy/dx refers to the discrete change from the base level. Absolute threshold refers to 75 percent for short-term PTR and 50 percent for long-term PTR and METR. N = 212,607.  
Source: own calculations using EUROMOD version H1.0 
 Coefficients Marginal effects (dy/dx) 
 A. Short-term PTR B. Long-term PTR C. METR A. Short-term PTR B. Long-term PTR C. METR 
Men 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 
Women -0.040*** (0.000) -0.122*** (0.000) 0.018*** (0.000) -0.010*** (0.000) -0.028*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
<30 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 
30-50 0.310*** (0.000) -0.036*** (0.000) 0.162*** (0.000) 0.071*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) 0.033*** (0.000) 
50+ 0.354*** (0.000) -0.227*** (0.000) 0.036*** (0.000) 0.082*** (0.000) -0.051*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.000) 
low-skilled 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 
medium-skilled -0.067*** (0.000) -0.048*** (0.000) -0.026*** (0.000) -0.016*** (0.000) -0.011*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) 
high-skilled -0.102*** (0.000) -0.131*** (0.000) -0.067*** (0.000) -0.025*** (0.000) -0.031*** (0.000) -0.014*** (0.000) 
employed 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 
self-employed -0.687*** (0.000) 0.473*** (0.000) 0.153*** (0.000) -0.148*** (0.000) 0.123*** (0.000) 0.034*** (0.000) 
main earner 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 
secondary earner 0.031*** (0.000) -0.611*** (0.000) -0.303*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.000) -0.134*** (0.000) -0.061*** (0.000) 
full-time 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 
part-time -0.120*** (0.000) -0.128*** (0.000) 0.119*** (0.000) -0.028*** (0.000) -0.029*** (0.000) 0.026*** (0.000) 
Q1 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 
Q2 -0.031*** (0.000) -0.057*** (0.000) -0.175*** (0.000) -0.008*** (0.000) -0.016*** (0.000) -0.038*** (0.000) 
Q3 -0.210*** (0.000) -0.310*** (0.000) -0.406*** (0.000) -0.051*** (0.000) -0.083*** (0.000) -0.080*** (0.000) 
Q4 -0.162*** (0.000) -0.576*** (0.000) -0.120*** (0.000) -0.040*** (0.000) -0.142*** (0.000) -0.027*** (0.000) 
Q5 -0.261*** (0.000) -0.793*** (0.000) 0.085*** (0.000) -0.063*** (0.000) -0.182*** (0.000) 0.020*** (0.000) 
non-poor 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 
poverty risk 0.635*** (0.000) 0.640*** (0.000) 0.329*** (0.000) 0.165*** (0.000) 0.175*** (0.000) 0.077*** (0.000) 
low risk of UE 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 0.000 (.) 
high risk of UE -0.095*** (0.000) 0.140*** (0.000) 0.188*** (0.000) -0.022*** (0.000) 0.034*** (0.000) 0.042*** (0.000) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.305 0.182 0.167  
 
